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I. INTRODUCTION
The global vitamins cartel was "the most pervasive and harmful criminal
antitrust conspiracy ever uncovered."' From 1990 to 1999, multinational firms
based in Canada, Germany, Japan, Switzerland, and the United States
colluded to fix prices, rig bids, and allocate global market shares in their sale
2of vitamin products. These products are critical for human and animal
nutrition and affect more than $5 billion of global commerce.3 Reflecting the
scope of the crime, the antitrust penalties imposed in the United States were
staggering. Members of the cartel paid nearly $1 billion in fines. 4 Hoffman-
LaRoche, the cartel's leader, paid a $500 million fine, the largest criminal fine
ever collected by the United States.5 Six of the main conspirators settled a
private class action lawsuit by domestic purchasers of vitamin products for
$1.05 billion, "the largest private anti-trust price-fixing settlement in history. 6
Individual corporate executives were sentenced to prison in the United States.
Other jurisdictions-including Europe, Canada, Japan, and Australia-levied
both criminal and civil penalties against the conspirators.7
"Vitamins Inc."8 exemplified the durability, breadth, and harm of
international cartels. 9 One study identified forty international cartels that
operated in the 1990s; they had members in over thirty countries, operated in
markets with annual sales of $30 billion, 10 and survived an average of six
years." The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) estimated that over $28 billion in total commerce was annually
implicated in sixteen of the largest international cartels that were prosecuted
between 1996 and 2000; the OECD estimated that the median amount of harm
in each case was fifteen to twenty percent of the affected commerce.' 2 For
example, the graphite electrodes cartel of six American, German, and
Japanese firms engaged in a five-year price-fixing conspiracy that affected
1. David Barboza, Tearing Down the Facade of 'Vitamins, Inc. ', N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1999,
§ 3, at I (quoting Joel Klein).
2. See Harry First, The Vitamins Case: Cartel Prosecutions and the Coming of International
Competition Law, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 711, 712-22 (2001).
3. U.S. ATT'Y GEN. INT'L COMPETITION POLICY ADVISORY COMM. TO THE ATr'Y GEN. AND
ASSISTANT ATT'Y GEN. FOR ANTITRUST, FINAL REPORT 174 (2000), available at
www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/finalreport.htm [hereinafter ANTITRUST FINAL REPORT].
4. Barboza, supra note 1, at 1. All corporate defendants pleaded guilty.
5. First, supra note 2, at 715.
6. Id. at 718.
7. ANTITRUST FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 174.
8. The cartel gave itself this nickname. See Barboza, supra note 1, at 1.
9. For this Note, "international cartels" are cartels with international effects. Their
membership may be exclusively foreign, exclusively domestic, or a mix of the two. In contrast,
"domestic cartels" are exclusively comprised of domestic firms with effects confined to their domestic
market. "Domestic export cartels" are a subgroup of international cartels. They are exclusively
comprised of domestic firms with effects exclusively in foreign markets.
10. Simon J. Evenett, Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, International Cartel
Enforcement: Lessons from the 1990s, WORLD ECON., Sept. 2001, at 1, 6.
11. Id. at 6. "Some of these cartels lasted for two decades before antitrust intervention. Other
cartels lasted less than a year. Twenty-four of these forty cartels lasted for at least four years, certainly
long enough to have had a significant effect on consumers." Id. at 6-7.
12. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., HARD CORE CARTELS: RECENT PROGRESS AND
CHALLENGES AHEAD 8-10 (2003) [hereinafter HARD CORE CARTELS].
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nearly $1.7 billion in American sales alone.' 3 The four-year citric acid cartel
of American, German, Swiss, French, and Dutch firms involved a market of
$1.2 billion in worldwide sales. 14 The lysine cartel of American, Japanese, and
Korean firms raised the product's price by seventy percent in a $600 million
global market.' 5 These conspiracies, and many others, were well-organized
operations that were fully aware of their criminality and attempted to conceal
their efforts by meeting overseas, using code names, and destroying evidence
of their efforts.'
6
Vitamins Inc. also illustrated key aspects of the fight against these
harmful conspiracies. First, government amnesty policies are critical to
identify and prosecute cartels.' Second, enhanced fines and prison sentences
are necessary to deter what is extremely profitable criminal activity. Third,
private litigation enhances the punishment, and therefore the deterrence, of
international cartels. Fourth, enforcement of antitrust laws is a multi-national
effort that is greatly strengthened by cooperation among international
authorities.
However, Vitamins Inc. revealed weaknesses as well in the fight against
international cartels. In particular, a series of cases in U.S. courts exposed
latent tensions regarding the extraterritorial application of American antitrust
laws and the difficulty of ensuring adequate global deterrence of international
cartels. F. Hoffinan-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran &A.18 involved a lawsuit
against the members of Vitamins Inc.-all foreign defendants-by foreign
plaintiffs for harms caused by their foreign purchases of vitamins. (These will
be referred to as "Empagran-type cases."'19) The case implicated the Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA). 20 The Supreme Court was asked
to decide whether U.S. courts could exercise jurisdiction over lawsuits by
foreigners for antitrust injuries sustained abroad. Many governments, 21
13. ANTITRUST FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 172.
14. Id. at 171.
15. Id The OECD notes that at Archer Daniels Midland Company (ADM), the lysine cartel's
leader, the "oft-quoted unofficial motto" was "[o]ur competitors are our friends; our customers are our
enemies." HARD CORE CARTELS, supra note 12, at 11.
16. First, supra note 2.
17. See ANTITRUST FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 174 ("The Antitrust Division's ability to
crack the conspiracy turned on cooperation from a conspirator [Rhone Poulenc] which qualified for
amnesty under the [U.S. Department of Justice's] Corporate Leniency Policy."). Parallel public and
private investigations uncovered the cartel. See First, supra note 2.
18. 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
19. An "Empagran-type case" is one in which foreign plaintiffs bring a case in U.S. court for
violations of the anti-cartel provisions of America's antitrust laws for harms sustained in foreign
transactions.
20. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2000).
21. See Brief of the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and Belgium in
Support of Petitioners, F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (No. 03-724)
[hereinafter Germany Amicus Brief]; Brief of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, Ireland and the Kingdom of the Netherlands as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, F.
Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (No. 03-724) [hereinafter United
Kingdom Amicus Brief]; Brief for the Government of Canada as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal, F.
Hoffman-LaRoche v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (No. 03-724) [hereinafter Canada Amicus
Brief]; Brief of the Government of Japan as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, F. Hoffman-
LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (No. 03-724) [hereinafter Japan Amicus Brief].
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including the United States, 22 argued strongly that U.S. courts should not have
jurisdiction in such cases in order to prevent forum shopping and to protect
the amnesty programs that are critical to uncovering these cartels.
Instead of fully addressing this matter, the Supreme Court's Empagran
decision focused on a more specific question. The Court asked whether U.S.
courts had jurisdiction over lawsuits by foreigners for antitrust injuries
sustained abroad when those injuries were independent of any injuries
sustained domestically. The Court held that U.S. courts did not have
jurisdiction "where the plaintiffs claim rests solely on the independent
foreign harm. 23 The Supreme Court did not consider the plaintiffs
contention that U.S. jurisdiction existed due to interdependence between the
foreign and domestic harms, because the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals had
not addressed that argument. Instead, the Court remanded the case so the
Court of Appeals could consider it.
24
The Supreme Court's Empagran opinion was appropriately narrow,
because the case involved complex policy questions better addressed by the
political branches rather than the judiciary. By remanding the case, the
Supreme Court gave the political branches an opportunity to craft a more
nuanced policy response to the difficult problem posed by Empagran-type
cases. In this Note, I explore what such a policy response might be.
This Note proceeds as follows. Part II provides general economic and
legal background. The concurrent jurisdiction issues presented by the
Empagran case must be considered in light of the economic concerns raised
by international cartels and addressed by America's antitrust laws.
Part III discusses the more specific legal background regarding judicial
interpretations of the FTAIA. Analyzing the Supreme Court's Empagran
decision and the three lower court decisions that preceded it, I conclude that
the Court attempted to redirect the U.S. judiciary to consider what plaintiffs
must show to establish a sufficient connection to the United States to justify
U.S. jurisdiction. The Empagran opinion hinted at the proper analytical frame
for making this determination: 'inextricably linked' or intertwined foreign and
domestic harms. Regrettably, the Court stepped back from fully articulating
this economically sound basis for jurisdiction, and in remanding the case to
the D.C. Circuit, it instead permitted that court to consider the conceptually
unsatisfactory (in the cartel context) "but-for causation." As a result, a circuit
split is emerging over whether inextricably linked or intertwined effects or
some form of causation is the proper basis for considering jurisdiction in
Empagran-type cases. I argue that the Supreme Court should fully endorse the
concept of inextricably linked or intertwined effects as a basis of jurisdiction,
thus ensuring U.S. jurisdiction over at least some Empagran-type cases.
The Supreme Court may be reluctant to endorse such a basis because of
two significant concerns advanced by the United States and foreign
governments in their amici briefs in Empagran, but left unresolved by the
22. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, F. Hoffman-LaRoche
v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (No. 03-724) [hereinafter United States Amicus Brief].
23. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 159.
24. Id. at 175. As discussed in Part II infra, the D.C. Circuit dismissed the plaintiffs'
remaining claims. Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., 417 F.3d 1267 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
Keeping US. Courts Open
Empagran decision. The first concern is policy-based, that U.S. jurisdiction in
Empagran-type cases will undermine the government amnesty programs that
have become the primary means of identifying international cartels. The
second concern is legal, that because the U.S. courts are perceived to be more
favorable to plaintiffs, U.S. jurisdiction in Empagran-type cases will
encourage foreign plaintiffs to engage in forum shopping. Such forum
shopping could undermine the antitrust regimes of the foreign governments,
clog the U.S. court system, and undermine cooperation between the United
States and foreign governments. In Part IV, I provide a detailed discussion of
these concerns.
In Part V, I turn to my proposed solution to these legal and policy
concerns. I first emphasize that a satisfactory solution must achieve three U.S.
foreign policy goals with respect to international antitrust: (1) maximum
deterrence of international cartels, (2) a consistent and predictable national
policy on jurisdiction that will reduce uncertainty regarding the cost of trading
in U.S. commerce, and (3) harmonization of antitrust policies globally. With
respect to the amnesty policies, I show that the problem posed by Empagran-
type suits is one that depends on the specific structure of these policies. I
argue that governments can ensure that U.S. jurisdiction over Empagran-type
suits will strengthen use of these amnesty programs if they reciprocally agree
to collaborate, in a predictable fashion, to mutually provide amnesty to the
same member of a cartel.
Turning to the forum shopping concerns expressed by the governments,
I first note that an effective policy response must distinguish Empagran-type
suits that concern litigants based in countries with effective antitrust regimes,
from suits that concern litigants based in countries with ineffective antitrust
regimes. Within this perspective, I consider the various proposals that have
been offered to make this distinction. I first review the often-proposed
suggestion of interest-balancing comity analysis; I find it completely
inadequate. I suggest that the doctrine of forum non conveniens provides the
correct principles to address Empagran-type suits. However, I conclude that
forum non conveniens is an unsatisfactory response as it still relies on a case-
by-case judicial review that fails to provide a consistent, predictable national
policy on jurisdiction and that fails to encourage international harmonization
in antitrust policies. I next consider a proposal to allow the executive branch
to recommend to individual U.S. courts when jurisdiction should not be
exercised in Empagran-type suits. I still find this response inadequate due to
its case-by-case approach and the discretion it affords the judiciary to ignore
the executive branch's determination. I therefore propose congressional
legislation that would empower the executive branch to annually limit U.S.
court jurisdiction of Empagran-type cases. This legislation would embrace the
principles of forum non conveniens by refusing U.S. jurisdiction over
Empagran-type cases that involve litigants from countries that provide a more
convenient, effective forum through which the plaintiffs can receive adequate
relief. I argue that this legislation would achieve the three U.S. foreign policy
goals with respect to maximum deterrence of cartels, facilitation of
international trade, and harmonization of antitrust policies.
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These legislative and policy changes will bring both consistency and
nuance to America's treatment of Empagran-type suits. I further argue that
they will promote harmonization of antitrust policies, which must precede any
attempt to create an international regime to address the problem of
international cartels. These proposals will also advance U.S. interests much
more than will the broad, judicial response of closing the U.S. courts to all
foreign plaintiffs who bring suit for foreign injuries-a measure I view as a
judicial surrender of America's interest in protecting its consumers and
enterprises from collusion, which the Supreme Court has declared the
"supreme evil of antitrust. '25
II. BACKGROUND
A core aspect of America's antitrust regime is its encouragement of
private litigation as an enforcement device. Private litigation is thought to be
particularly effective against cartels, as the consumers in a cartel market may
often be among the first entities to detect the cartel's damaging collusive
behavior, and awarding damages-particularly a multiple of the cartel's
profits-may make the illegal conduct cost-prohibitive. Thus, private
litigation is viewed as an important mechanism for achieving one of the
fundamental goals of the antitrust acts: the maximum deterrence of cartels.2
6
Initially, the application of America's antitrust regime was contained
within its borders. But as commerce became increasingly international after
World War II, U.S. courts applied the antitrust laws extraterritorially.
America's extraterritorial application of its antitrust laws created tension with
its trading partners, who disagreed with the American approach of relying on
private litigation and treble damages as an enforcement device. They viewed
the extraterritorial application of U.S. law as an anticompetitive maneuver
aimed at furthering U.S. trade objectives. In the late 1970s and early 1980s,
many of these countries passed legislation to frustrate the extraterritorial
application of America's antitrust laws. The U.S. Congress responded by
passing the FTAIA. This law barred foreigners from using America's laws
against American companies when American consumers were not harmed.
The Empagran decision-and the governments' amici briefs-must be
understood within this context of antitrust policy as trade policy.
A. The Sherman and Clayton Acts
The Sherman and Clayton Acts are the statutory foundation for private
antitrust litigation in the United States. The Sherman Antitrust Act outlaws
"[e]very contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations., 27 Violations are
25. Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408
(2004).
26. See Donald I. Baker, The Use of Criminal Law Remedies To Deter and Punish Cartels and
Bid-Rigging, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 693, 713 (2001) ("[Dleterrence is the critical issue in prosecuting
those who participate in highly profitable covert activities that are clearly illegal.").
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
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*2 8 *tfelonies, with corporations and individuals facing civil and criminal
penalties, including imprisonment.29
To expand the enforcement of the antitrust laws and to facilitate the
compensation of the victims of antitrust harms, Congress adopted the Clayton
Act. Section 4 of the Clayton Act creates a private cause of action for
individuals and companies harmed by antitrust violations, 30 and section 12
grants jurisdiction over these lawsuits to any district in which the defendant
does business.3 ' Plaintiffs in such lawsuits act as "private attorneys general, 32
who help alert authorities to violations of the antitrust laws while also
punishing those violations. The Clayton Act allows private litigants to sue for
treble damages. Treble damages enhance deterrence in two ways-they
encourage private suits, which raise the probability the cartel will be
detected,33 and they increase the penalty imposed on defendants found guilty




Cartels are "unambiguously bad ' 36 and "the most egregious violations of
competition law."3 7 The collusion they engage in the "supreme evil of
28. Originally, violations of the Sherman Act were misdemeanors. In 1974, Congress
amended the act to make violations felonies. Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, Pub. L. No. 93-
528, 88 Stat. 1706, 1708 (1974) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000)).
29. Congressional amendments in the summer of 2004 raised the maximum allowable
criminal fines to $100 million for organizations and $1 million for individuals and the maximum
allowable prison sentence to ten years. Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of
2004, Pub. L. No. 108-237, 118 Stat. 665 (2004) (current version at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 2005)).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000) ("[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefore ... and shall recover threefold the
damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.").
31. 15 U.S.C. § 22 (2000) ("Any suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws against a
corporation may be brought not only in the judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in any
district wherein it may be found or transacts business."). For a discussion of section 12's historical
development, see Jeremy C. Bates, Comment, Home Is Where the Hurt Is: Forum Non Coveniens and
Antitrust, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 281.
32. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972); see also Hannah L. Buxbaum, The
Private Attorney General in a Global Age: Public Interests in Private International Antitrust Litigation,
26 YALE J. INT'L L. 219, 222 (2001) ("A private litigant acts as a private attorney general if the litigant
asserts a cause of action not only to obtain compensation, but also to vindicate important public
interests.").
33. See Spencer Weber Waller, The Incoherence of Punishment in Antitrust, 78 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 207, 211 (2003) (quoting PHILIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 149-50 (1978))
("Such awards generate a powerful incentive for injured persons to detect, disclose, attack, and end
violations of the antitrust laws.").
34. See Baker, supra note 26, at 703 ("In most cases, the private recovery of treble damages
under the Clayton Act continues to be an even bigger economic threat to a corporation than the amount
of the Sherman Act fine."); Buxbaum, supra note 32, at 223 ("This statutory framework [for damages]
reveals Congress's intention to motivate a level of private enforcement that would ensure significant
compliance with the antitrust laws.").
35. See Donald I. Baker, Revisiting History--What Have We Learned About Private Antitrust
Enforcement That We Would Recommend to Others?, 16 LoY. CONSUMER L. REV. 379, 380 (2004)
("[The Sherman and Clayton Acts] have been broadly successful in encouraging active private antitrust
enforcement."); Buxbaum, supra note 32, at 223 ("In this, Congress was successful as private actions
have constituted a substantial portion of antitrust litigation."); Waller, supra note 33, at 210 ("The vast
majority of antitrust enforcement comes through private damage suits.").
36. HARD CORE CARTELS, supra note 12, at 15.
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antitrust. ' '3s A cartel is a group of firms in an industry that should be
competitors but have instead agreed to coordinate their activities so that they
can raise prices and earn profits above competitive market levels. Cartels
utilize a number of mechanisms to coordinate their activities, including
horizontal price fixing,39 bid rigging, territorial division,40 non-territorial
customer division, and market-share agreements. In addition to harming the
consumers of their products by charging supra-competitive prices, cartels also
reduce economic efficiency by causing consumers to purchase less of a
product than they otherwise would buy and by reducing the competitive
pressures that member firms face to control costs and to innovate.41
A cartel must overcome four challenges to operate successfully. First,
the cartel's members must reach agreement to restrict the supply of a product
and increase its price. A cartel restricts supply so that the loss from the lower
quantity of sales is more than offset by the increase in the price of each
remaining sale. The optimal cartel quantity and price is that of a monopoly
producer, but cartels rarely achieve that optimal level because cheating by
members and market entry by new producers increases market supply. Thus, a
second challenge for a cartel is to ensure that its members follow the agreed
course of action. Each cartel member has an incentive-to sell more than the
agreed quantity of the product-at the cartel price or one slightly below it-to
gain even more profit.42 Because cheating threatens the cartel's viability,
cartels must monitor their members and punish cheating.4 3 But monitoring is
difficult because of the third challenge inherent to cartels: their illegal actions
force them to operate in secrecy to avoid detection.44 Yet even if, while
operating in secret, cartels are able to monitor and punish cheaters, they still
must prevent entry by other firms into the market. Entrants will be enticed by
the opportunity to earn profits due to the extra-competitive cartel prices, and
their entry will drive down the cartel's profits. To maintain its hold on the
market, the cartel must prevent new entry, again without making the cartel
visible. The complexity of addressing these four challenges leads many
economists to conclude that cartels are "inherently unstable."4
37. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL
CONCERNING EFFECTIVE ACTION AGAINST HARD CORE CARTELS 2 (1998) [hereinafter
RECOMMENDATION OF THE OECD COUNCIL].
38. Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408
(2004).
39. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v.
Alston, 974 F.2d 1206 (9th Cir. 1992).
40. See Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990); United States v. Topco Assocs.,
405 U.S. 596 (1972).
41. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., FIGHTING HARD CORE CARTELS: HARM,
EFFECTIVE SANCTIONS AND LENIENCY PROGRAMMES 71-72 (2002) [hereinafter CARTELS: HARMS AND
SANCTIONS].
42. Evenett et al., supra note 10, at 3-4.
43. The OECD documents a variety of "elaborate enforcement and punishment mechanisms"
that cartels have devised. In the citric acid and lysine cartels, "compensation schemes were devised,
whereby a cartel member that exceeded its sales quota was required to purchase excess production from
fellow cartel members the following year." See HARD CORE CARTELS, supra note 12, at 12. See
generally Evenett et al., supra note 10, at 4-45.
44. Id.
45. Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REv. 515, 518 (2004).
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Certain market characteristics are conducive to collusive activity. Cartels
often operate in concentrated markets with few firms, permitting easier
coordination and more reliable confidentiality.46 Markets with high initial
investment costs are also conducive to cartel activity. These costs deter other
firms from quickly entering the market to take advantage of the cartel's
artificially high prices.47 Products that are homogenous and fungible also
facilitate cartel activity. a Such products are usually uniformly priced, making
it easier for cartels to monitor member prices. Finally, market structures, such
as public disclosure laws regarding prices and quantities, can help cartels
monitor their members' activities.
Market characteristics alone cannot sustain a cartel; cartel members must
adopt a variety of practices to avoid detection and to enforce compliance.
Cartels avoid detection by holding secret meetings, using code names, and
creating legitimate-appearing trade associations to share information.49
Generally, cartel members meet periodically to review public and private sales
and price figures from prior periods. They also force members who exceed
their quotas to compensate the other members.50 Thus, cartels overcome their
inherent instability by successfully providing supra-competitive profits to their
members while maintaining the secrecy of their collusion and punishing any
deviations. Indeed, based on the fact that twenty-four of the forty international
cartels prosecuted in the 1990s had operated for at least four years, one study
concluded, "market forces alone may be unable to quickly undermine attempts
to fix prices, rig bids, allocate quotas, and market shares; perhaps implying a
potential role for national anti-cartel enforcement."
51
46. HARD CORE CARTELS, supra note 12, at 10; see also Robert C. Marshall, Leslie M. Marx
& Matthew E. Raiff, Cartel Price Announcements: The Vitamins Industry 26 (Feb. I1, 2005)
(unnumbered working paper), available at
http://www.bateswhite.com/news/pdf/Cartel%20Price%2OAnnouncements--
The%20Vitamins%20Industry.pdf [hereinafter Cartel Price Announcements] ("The vitamins industry is
highly concentrated."). Table A.2, Appendix A of the paper lists the number of vitamins manufacturers
by vitamin. Id. at 28.
47. For example, vitamins are produced through chemical or fermentation processes that
require large capital expenditures, costly inputs, and substantial time before a plant is effective in
producing a given vitamin. Id. at 26. Cartels also build artificial barriers to entry as explained by Evenett
et al., supra note 10, at 5.
48. HARD CoRE CARTELS, supra note 12, at 10; see also Cartel Price Announcements, supra
note 46, at 26 ("A given vitamin product made by one firm is chemically identical to the same product
made by another firm.... Purchasers are aware of the fact that vitamin products are homogenous.").
49. See William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Compliance Programs: The Government Perspective, Speech Before the
Corporate Compliance 2002 Conference (July 12, 2002) ("The most startling characteristic of the
multinational cartels we have prosecuted is how cold blooded and bold they are .... they went to great
lengths to cover-up their actions-such as using code names with one another, meeting in secret venues
around the world, creating false 'covers'-i.e., facially legal justifications-for their meetings, using
home phone numbers to contact one another, and giving explicit instructions to destroy any evidence of
the conspiracy.").
50. For additional descriptions of how international cartels adopt these practices, see
ANTITRUST FINAL REPORT, supra note 3. For a description specific to the vitamins cartel, see Cartel
Price Announcements, supra note 46.
51. Julian L. Clarke & Simon J. Evenett, The Deterrent Effects of National Anticartel Laws:
Evidence from the International Vitamins Cartel, 48 ANTITRUST BULL. 689, 690 (2003).
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C. International Cartels
Certain characteristics of the global marketplace increase the ability of
international cartels to monitor their members and maintain secrecy. The
publication of official import and export data facilitates the cartel's
monitoring of its members . National differences in accounting, reporting
requirements, and other legal mandates help cartels to hide their activities and
profits. 53 National borders mask agreements to divide a product market among
competitors,54 and they can facilitate the punishment of cheaters.55 Cartel
members also frustrate the efforts of effective policing authorities by meeting
and retaining records outside their jurisdictions.56
Almost invariably, any international cartel harms consumers in all of the
countries in which its product is sold. If an international cartel does not raise
prices everywhere, a product sold at a cheaper price in one country can be
resold in another country where the price is higher. This arbitrage threat exists
as long as transaction costs, including transportation costs, are low and the
product is undifferentiated across the various countries. If the cartel's product
is sold in the United States, the cartel must raise its price in the United States
sufficiently so that it is not profitable to buy the product in the United States,
ship it to another market, and sell it at or below the cartel price. Thus, because
cartels must address the arbitrage threat by raising prices in all of the markets
in which they operate, the harms caused by the cartels in those markets are
interconnected.
To effectively deter cartels, the total expected penalty must at least equal
the supra-competitive profits from participating in the cartel.57 Because an
international cartel enjoys supra-competitive profits from its sales in other
countries, "[tihe relevant expected penalty depends on the sum of the expected
penalties in each nation., 58 According to the OECD, sanctions against cartels
"are, on the whole, still inadequate" 59 in most countries. Therefore, cartels
will raise their prices in the United States even though doing so increases the
likelihood of the cartel's detection due to the United States's more rigorous
antitrust regime. The international cartel will still harm American consumers
52. Evenett et al., supra note 10, at 4.
53. Cartel members often must agree on mechanisms, such as a central body to collect
information, outside these legal regimes to ensure that these same differences do not impede their
monitoring activities. HARD CORE CARTELS, supra note 12, at 10.
54. Id. at 4.
55. See Evenett et al., supra note 10, at 17 ("As the number of markets in which a cartel
operates increases, each cartel member can be more successfully deterred from cheating on the cartel
agreement in any one market by the threat of retaliation by other members in all the markets in which
the cartel operates.").
56. See id. ("[IUn 1994 the US case against General Electric, which along with DeBeers and
several European firms were thought to be cartelizing the market for industrial diamonds, collapsed with
the trial judge citing the inability of US enforcement authorities to secure the necessary evidence from
abroad.").
57. See Brief of Amici Curiae Economists Joseph E. Stiglitz and Peter R. Orszag in Support of
Respondents at *2-3, F. Hoffman-LaRoche v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (No. 03-724)
[hereinafter Amici Brief of Stiglitz and Orszag] ("[Elffective deterrence . . . requires that the total
expected penalty (which is equal to the probability of detection and conviction multiplied by the
penalty) be at least equal to aggregate profits from the [prohibited] activity . .
58. Id. at *4.
59. HARD CORE CARTELS, supra note 12, at 3.
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because it can offset its expected American losses with its supra-competitive
profits from countries where it has little fear of penalty. As a result, "the
deterrent required to prevent a global cartel from including the United States
is generally larger than the deterrent required to prevent a purely domestic
cartel from forming."
60
D. Extraterritorial Reach ofAmerica's Antitrust Regime
To protect American consumers from the effects of international
collusion, the United States has applied its antitrust laws extraterritorially. The
basis for this extraterritorial reach is the "effects test," first articulated in
United States v. Alcoa.61 Foreign participants in an international cartel can be
prosecuted under American antitrust laws when their activities (1) were
intended to affect domestic commerce, and (2) did affect domestic
commerce. 62 "[I]t is well established by now that the Sherman Act applies to
foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact produce some
substantial effect in the United States. 63
America's trading partners have vigorously opposed and acted to
frustrate the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law.64 They view that
application as an attempt to strengthen America's trade position while
imposing America's economic policies on the rest of the world.65 Canada was
66the first country to respond by enacting a "blocking statute" in 1947. Other
countries followed Canada's example.
6f
The availability of treble damages in private actions greatly exacerbates
foreign opposition to the extraterritorial reach of America's laws.68 In the
60. Amici Brief of Stiglitz and Orszag, supra note 57, at *4.
61. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
62. See id. at 443 ("[I]t is settled law ... that any state may impose liabilities, even upon
persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders
which the state reprehends ....").
63. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993); see also F. Hoffman-
LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004) ("But our courts have long held that
application of our antitrust laws to foreign anticompetitive conduct is nonetheless reasonable ... insofar
as they reflect a legislative effort to redress domestic antitrust injury that foreign anticompetitive conduct
has caused.").
64. See generally Joseph P. Griffin, Foreign Government Reactions to US. Assertions of
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 6 GEO. MASON L. REv. 505 (1998).
65. In some cases, these views may have been quite accurate. See Laker Airways Ltd. v.
Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984); In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d
1248 (7th Cir. 1980); In re Ocean Shipping Antitrust Litig., 500 F. Supp. 1235 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); see
also Griffin, supra note 64, at 517-18 (stating that "[t]he subsequent U.S. government investigation and
private treble damages litigation [in the Uranium Antitrust Litigation] outraged the foreign governments
because the cartel was created as the result of the anticompetitive conduct of the U.S. government," and
noting that "[s]imilarly, the Ocean Shipping cases were viewed abroad as unilateral attempts by the
United States to alter long-established internationally agreed-upon practices, which attempts, if
successful, would do substantial harm to national and international ocean shipping").
66. A blocking statute either makes it lawful for foreign citizens to refuse discovery in an
American antitrust action, or makes it unlawful for non-citizens of those countries to make discovery
requests of their citizens in support of an antitrust suit in the U.S. See Griffin, supra note 64, at 505 n.3
("The first statute 'blocking' discovery was enacted by the Parliament of Ontario in response to a U.S.
investigation of the Canadian newsprint industry in 1947."); see also Joseph P. Griffin,
Extraterritoriality in U.S. and EUAntitrust Enforcement, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 159 (1999).
67. Griffin, supra note 64, at 505-06.
68. See Buxbaum, supra note 32, at 251.
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1980s, foreign frustration with the United States's unique treble damage
awards resulted in passage by the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada of
frustration-of-judgments statutes69 and "clawback" statutes7° to prevent the
United States from enforcing its treble damage judgments. Although the
antitrust policies of the United States and other developed nations have
converged over the past twenty years, "the availability of treble damages
awards in private antitrust litigation is widely considered to be one of the most
unacceptable aspects of U.S. regulatory law. 71
E. The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act
Congress passed the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act
(FTAIA) 77 in 1982, when antitrust tensions between America and its trading
allies were high. American companies complained that they could not
participate in collusive export ventures that would not harm U.S. consumers
for fear that foreigners would use America's antitrust laws against them.
Congress therefore sought to "increase United States exports of products and
services by encouraging more efficient provision of export trade services to
United States producers and suppliers, in particular by . . . modifying the
application of the antitrust laws to certain export trade. 73
The resultant FTAIA states:
Sections I to 7 of this title shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce (other
than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations unless-(l) such conduct has
a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect-(A) on trade or commerce which
is not trade or commerce with foreign nations, or on import trade or import commerce
with foreign nations; or (B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of a
person engaged in such trade or commerce in the United States; and (2) such effect gives
rise to a claim under the provisions of sections 1 to 7 of this title, other than this section.
If sections 1 to 7 of this title apply to such conduct only because of the operations of
paragraph (1)(B), then sections 1 to 7 of this title shall apply to such conduct only for
injury to export business in the United States.14
As explained by the Supreme Court:
This technical language initially lays down a general rule placing all (non-import)
activity involving foreign commerce outside the Sherman Act's reach. It then brings such
conduct back within the Sherman Act's reach provided that the conduct both (1)
sufficiently affects American commerce, i.e., it has a "direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effect" on American domestic, import, or (certain) export commerce, and (2)
69. See Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act of Canada, R.S.C., ch. F 29 (1985); Foreign
Proceedings (Excess of Jurisdiction) Act, No. 3, 1984 (Austl.). Frustration-of-judgment measures allow
government officials to refuse to recognize or enforce judgments against their citizens obtained in
foreign courts. See Griffin, supra note 64, at 505.
70. A clawback statute "enables certain defendants who have paid multiple damage judgments
in an overseas country to recover the multiple portion of that judgment from the successful plaintiff."
Joseph E. Neuhaus, Power To Reverse Foreign Judgments: The British Clawback Statute Under
International Law, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1097, 1098 (1981).
71. Buxbaum, supra note 32, at 251.
72. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2000).
73. Export Trading Company Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, § 102(b), 96 Stat. 1234.
74. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2000).
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has an effect of a kind that antitrust law considers harmful, i.e., the "effect" must "giv[e]
rise to a [Sherman Act] claim.",
75
Congress intended the FTAIA to allow U.S. firms to profit from other
countries' less stringent competition laws by barring foreigners from suing
such firms in the United States if the firm's conduct was not harming the
United States market. Over the past decade, U.S. courts have had to consider a
different question: does the FTAIA bar U.S. courts from accepting jurisdiction
over anti-cartel suits brought by foreign nationals for harms they suffered
abroad when the cartel's activity also harmed U.S. consumers?
III. THE FTAIA CONTROVERSY
Nearly twenty years after the FTAIA was passed, three circuit courts of
appeals considered whether the statute barred jurisdiction over claims by
foreigners that they were harmed in foreign transactions involving
international cartels. The circuit courts gave different interpretations of the
FTAIA, ranging from the narrow view that jurisdiction exists only if the
foreign harm directly arose from a domestic harm to the expansive view that
jurisdiction exists over any foreign claim that alleged underlying conduct that
could have also caused a domestic harm. In Empagran, the Supreme Court
attempted to redirect the courts to consider what connection to a domestic
harm is necessary for a foreign plaintiff to establish U.S. jurisdiction. The
Court hinted at an economically satisfactory basis for such jurisdiction-
intertwined foreign and domestic harms that are inextricably bound up in one
another. However in remanding the case, the Court instead asked the D.C.
Circuit to consider "but-for causation." As a result, a new circuit split is
emerging. District courts in two circuits have recognized that jurisdiction
exists when the foreign and domestic harms are intertwined, but the D.C.
Circuit held that the domestic harm must directly cause the foreign harm. I
argue that the Supreme Court should fully endorse the view that jurisdiction
exists when the foreign and domestic harms are inextricably linked, allowing
the courts to then consider what a foreign plaintiff must show to establish that
a domestic harm has occurred.
A. Den Norske
The first appeals case to interpret the FTAIA in this context was Den
Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. Heeremac Vof 76 The case involved an alleged
cartel among the world's three heavy-lift barge services, which are crucial to
off-shore oil drilling. The plaintiff, Statoil, was a Norwegian oil company that
operated exclusively in the North Sea. Statoil alleged that the three barge
services engaged in a territorial division of the North Sea, Far East, and Gulf
of Mexico markets. One company received a higher allocation of North Sea
projects in exchange for agreeing to stay out of the Gulf of Mexico, where the
two other companies operated. Statoil contended that this conspiracy forced it
75. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 162 (2004) (quoting 15
U.S.C. § 6a (2000).
76. 241 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2001).
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to pay higher prices for barge services in the North Sea. It filed its lawsuit
after the defendants plead guilty to criminal antitrust charges brought by the
DOJ in 1998." It argued that the U.S. courts had jurisdiction over the suit
because the territorial division that caused its harm could only have been
maintained by also harming American oil companies that purchased barge
services in the Gulf of Mexico.78
The Fifth Circuit disagreed with Statoil, holding that "the FTAIA
precludes subject matter jurisdiction over claims by foreign plaintiffs against
defendants where the situs of the injjury is overseas and that injury arises from
effects in a non-domestic market." The court acknowledged that the cartel's
territorial division had a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect
in the United States: higher prices paid by oil companies operating in the Gulf
of Mexico. However, the court viewed Statoil's injury as arising from a
foreign effect of the defendant's conduct rather than from a domestic effect.8'
The court observed:
[W]hile we recognize that there may be a connection and an interrelatedness between the
higher prices paid for services in the Gulf of Mexico and the high prices paid in the North
Sea, the FTAIA requires more than a "close relationship" between the domestic injury
and the plaintiff's claim; it demands that the domestic effect "gives rise" to the claim."
2
Other courts also adopted this view.
83
Judge Patrick Higginbotham dissented from the Den Norske holding. He
argued that the FTAIA does not require that the domestic effect give rise to
the plaintiffs claim, but rather only to "a" claim.8 4 "In other words, the effect
on United States commerce must be sufficient to support a claim, an injury of
some person in a way cognizable under the Sherman Act."8 5 Judge
Higginbotham noted that the majority's interpretation would undermine
Congressional intent:
Under the majority's view, an American cartel that fixes prices worldwide will be subject
to Clayton Act suits by plaintiffs from around the world, but a foreign cartel that fixes
prices worldwide will be subject to suit under the Clayton Act only from plaintiffs injured
in American commerce. This interpretation of the FTAIA transforms a safe harbor for
77. Id. at 422-23. The defendants were fined over $49 million.
78. Id. at 422.
79. Id. at 428.
80. Id. at 426.
81. See id at 427 ("The higher prices American companies allegedly paid for services
provided by the McDermott defendants in the Gulf of Mexico does not give rise to Statoil's claim that it
paid inflated prices for HeereMac and Saipem's services in the North Sea.").
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 117 F. Supp. 2d 875, 885 (W.D. Wis. 2000)
("Nothing ...suggests that Congress intended that the scope of recovery would extend to persons
injured overseas by effects other than those felt by American markets."); Galavan Supplements, Ltd. v.
Archer Daniels Midland Co., No. C 97-3259 FMS, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18585, at *11 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 19, 1997) ("Because the relevant market is the United States domestic market, the more
appropriate plaintiffs to bring suit against defendants are the consumers injured by defendants' actions in
the United States.").
84. Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 432.
85. Id. at 432.
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American exporters into a boon for foreign cartels that restrain commerce in the United
States.
8 6
Focusing on the deterrence goal of American antitrust law, Judge
Higginbotham pointed out that:
Conspirators facing antitrust liability only to persons injured by their conspiracy's effects
on the United States may not be deterred from restraining trade in the United States. A
world-wide price-fixing scheme could sustain monopoly prices in the United States even
in the face of such liability if it could cross-subsidize its American operations with profits
from abroad.
8 7
He therefore concluded, "[w]hether the harm felt in the United States is the
source of the injury to the plaintiff is irrelevant; it is the effects on the United
States that create[] jurisdiction."88
B. Kruman v. Christie's
The Second Circuit offered a different interpretation of the FTAIA in
Kruman v. Christie's Int'l, PLC.89 Kruman involved allegations that the
world's two largest auction houses conspired to set the fees for their services.
The case followed a DOJ investigation in which Christie's received amnesty
conditional on its cooperation. 90 The plaintiffs were a class of foreign clients
of the auction houses who "all made purchases or sold goods in auctions held
outside the United States and claim that they were injured because they paid
inflated commissions to the defendants." 91 The defendants argued that the
FTAIA prevented U.S. courts from exercising jurisdiction over the plaintiffs'
claims.
The Second Circuit held that the FTAIA "does not determine which
plaintiffs can bring suit,"'92 and therefore U.S. courts have jurisdiction over
lawsuits by foreign plaintiffs for antitrust injuries sustained abroad. The court
pointed out that the FTAIA explicitly references the Sherman Act and not the
Clayton Act. "The substantive provisions of the Sherman Act determine what
conduct by the defendant is actionable. The Clayton Act determines what
injury a plaintiff must suffer in order to bring suit.... The text of the FTAIA
clearly reveals that its focus is... on the defendant's conduct. 9 3 Once foreign
plaintiffs establish that the defendant engaged in conduct that had a direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on U.S. commerce or U.S.
export trade, they could sue for damages sustained anywhere in the world. The
court believed its broad interpretation of jurisdiction accorded with the
deterrence goal of the antitrust regime: "Our markets benefit when antitrust
suits stop or deter any conduct that reduces competition in our markets
86. Id. at 434.
87. Id. at 435.
88. Id. at 439.
89. 284 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2002).
90. HARD CoRE CARTELS, supra note 12, at 13. Sotheby's was fined $45 million, and its
former chairman and its president and C.E.O. received criminal sanctions, including imprisonment.
91. Kruman, 284 F.3d at 389. A domestic class action lawsuit had previously settled. Id. at
391.
92. Id. at 402.
93. Id. at 398.
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regardless of where it occurs and whether it is also directed at foreign
markets."
94
C. D.C. Circuit's Empagran Opinion
A year later, the D.C. Circuit considered a case involving the vitamins
cartel. The plaintiffs in Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd.95 were
foreign purchasers of vitamins.96 The complaint alleged that the defendants-
twenty foreign manufacturers of vitamins-"engaged in an over-arching
worldwide conspiracy to raise, stabilize, and maintain the prices of vitamins"
that "affected virtually every market" where the defendants operated, with
"adverse effects in the United States and in other nations." 97 The defendants
argued that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because "the injuries
plaintiffs sought to redress were allegedly sustained in transactions that lack
any direct connection to United States commerce. 98
The D.C. Circuit held that, for a U.S. court to have jurisdiction, "a
plaintiff must show that the anticompetitive conduct violates the Sherman Act
and that the conduct's U.S. effect gives rise to someone's claim under it."99
The D.C. Circuit disagreed with the Kruman and Den Norske opinions. It
believed that the Kruman court "reach[ed] too far in its view of subject matter
jurisdiction." 100 The FTAIA's reference to "a claim" could not refer to the
defendant's conduct; it had to implicate the plaintiffs injury.1"' In contrast,
the D.C. Circuit found the Fifth Circuit's approach too restrictive for policy
reasons that echoed Judge Higginbotham's argument:
Suits only by those injured by the U.S. effects of a conspiracy may not provide sufficient
deterrence; a conspirator could expect that illegal profits abroad would offset his liability
in the U.S., leaving the conspirator with an incentive to engage in global conspiracy.
Allowing suits by those injured solely in foreign commerce, where the anticompetitive
conduct also harmed U.S. commerce, forces the conspirator to internalize the full costs of
his anticompetitive conduct.1
0 2
The court found that the foreign plaintiffs had standing because they had
brought suit alongside U.S. plaintiffs who had suffered actual injury in the
United States. The defendants appealed the D.C. Circuit's decision to the
Supreme Court, which led to the Empagran decision.
94. Id. at 393.
95. 315 F.3d 338 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
96. The plaintiffs were corporations from Australia, Belgium, Ecuador, Indonesia, Mexico,
Panama, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom. They originated their suit with two American plaintiffs as a
"class action lawsuit on behalf of foreign and domestic purchasers of vitamins." Id. at 342. After the
district court dismissed the foreign purchasers' claims, "the domestic plaintiffs... subsequently entered
into a court-approved stipulation that transferred their claims to another action pending before the
District Court, Proctor & Gamble Co. v. BASFAG, No. 99-3046 (M.D.L. No. 1285)." Id. at 343.
97. Id. at 340.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 351. The court wrote, "[t]o satisfy this requirement, the plaintiff must allege that
some private person or entity has suffered actual or threatened injury as a result of the U.S. effect of the
defendant's violation of the Sherman Act." Id. at 352.
100. Id.at341.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 356.
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D. The Supreme Court's Empagran Opinion
Rather than fully resolving the circuit split, the Supreme Court's opinion
in Empagran was narrowly tailored. The Court said: "The issue before us
concerns (1) significant foreign anticompetitive conduct with (2) an adverse
domestic effect and (3) an independent foreign effect giving rise to the
claim."103 Limiting its decision to this specific situation of an "independent
foreign effect," the Supreme Court held that in that situation the U.S. courts
did not have jurisdiction "where the plaintiffs claim rests solely on the
independent foreign harm."' 0 4 The Court declined to consider the plaintiffs'
argument that jurisdiction existed due to an interdependence between the
cartel's foreign and domestic harms, because the D.C. Circuit had not
addressed that argument in its decision. The Supreme Court therefore
remanded the case to the D.C. Circuit for consideration of that argument.1
05
The Supreme Court found little justification for the extraterritorial
application of American laws to conduct that causes independent foreign harm
because "application of those laws creates a serious risk of interference with a
foreign nation's ability independently to regulate its own commercial
affairs."
10 6
[The higher foreign prices of which the foreign plaintiffs here complain are not the
consequence of any domestic anticompetitive conduct that Congress sought to forbid...
. Rather, Congress sought to release domestic (and foreign) anticompetitive conduct from
Sherman Act constraints when that conduct [also] causes foreign harm. Congress, of
course, did make an exception where that conduct also causes domestic harm.... But
any independent domestic harm the foreign conduct causes here has, by definition, little
or nothing to do with the matter.
10 7
The Court based its analysis on the assumption that the foreign effect was
independent, and it carefully limited its decision, acknowledging that "the
underlying antitrust action is complex, potentially raising questions not
directly at issue here .... ,,10
E. Analysis of the Supreme Court's Empagran Opinion
The Supreme Court's Empagran decision was intentionally narrow and
potentially significant. The Court struck down the Kruman court's expansive
interpretation of the FTAIA. 10 9 Federal courts do not have jurisdiction over
antitrust suits by foreign plaintiffs for foreign harms solely because the
103. F. Hoffinan-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 159 (2004).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 175. As discussed further in this Part, the D.C. Circuit dismissed the plaintiffs'
remaining claims. The Supreme Court also remanded a Second Circuit case that was subsequently
dismissed because the plaintiff had not properly pleaded this alternative theory. See Sniado v. Bank Aus.
Ag, 378 F.3d 210, 213 (2d Cir. 2004) ("Sniado's amended complaint, liberally construed to the outer
limits of reasonableness, still lacks the factual predicate to support his alternative theory of
jurisdiction.").
106. 542 U.S. at 165.
107. Id. at 165-66.
108. Id. at 163-64.
109. See, e.g., JLM Indus. v. Stolt-Nielsen SA, 387 F.3d 163, 176 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that
Kruman "has since been abrogated"); Sniado, 378 F.3d at 212 (noting that Empagran "abrogat[ed] this
Court's holding in Kruman").
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anticompetitive conduct also allegedly caused a domestic injury somewhere to
someone. At a minimum, the Empagran decision requires foreign plaintiffs to
demonstrate that their injury and the domestic injury are not independent.
The opinion then raises the question: What is an "independent" injury in
the context of an international cartel? When a cartel raises the price of its
product in one country, it faces the threat that arbitrage will drive the price
back down unless it raises the product's price in every country in which it
operates. A cartel can avoid this arbitrage threat if the product cannot be
profitably resold between markets. This situation occurs if (1) high transaction
costs prevent profitable shipment of the product between nations; (2) the
products are sufficiently differentiated between markets so that the product
suitable to one market cannot be profitably resold in the other market; or (3)
legal barriers prevent moving the product from one market to the other.
Product markets in which these circumstances hold are quite rare. 10
If the foreign and domestic harms of most international cartels are not
independent, then upon what basis would a U.S. court have jurisdiction over
such claims? The Supreme Court did not explicitly address this question in its
Empagran opinion, and it was silent as to whether it agreed with the Den
Norske view that the domestic harm had to directly cause the foreign harm.
However, the Supreme Court suggested that jurisdiction would exist when the
foreign and domestic harms were intertwined or inextricably bound up with
one another. In Empagran, the Court looked to see if, previous to passage of
the FTAIA, U.S. courts exercised jurisdiction over Empagran-type suits. It
noted that in a previous case, Industria Siciliana Asfalti, Bitumi, S.p.A. v.
Exxon Research and Engineering Co.,' 11 "a district court permitted an Italian
firm to proceed against an American firm with a Sherman Act claim based
upon a purely foreign injury, i.e., an injury suffered in Italy." 112
Industria Siciliana's plaintiff was an Italian petroleum-refining company
that sought engineering bids to construct a new plant in Italy. An American
firm submitted a bid that was substantially below that of a wholly-owned
Exxon subsidiary, but the plaintiff was forced to contract with the Exxon
subsidiary in exchange for a favorable refining contract from the Exxon parent
company. The district court held that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the
plaintiff's claim because "the required impact upon United States commerce is
supplied by the allegation that trade in the export of design and engineering
services was restrained."'1 13 The court noted that the alleged tying arrangement
produced two simultaneous harms: one on the foreign purchaser who was
forced to engage in a sub-optimal transaction and the other on the domestic
seller who was prevented from engaging in the transaction. The court found
that the foreign plaintiff was suing based, in part, on the domestic harm. "In so
doing, the foreign plaintiff is not asserting the rights of third parties, but his
own, since the 'imposition' which it has suffered is inextricably bound up with
the domestic restraints of trade which have enabled the defendant to enforce
110. Pharmaceuticals may be an example that falls under the third situation, but patent laws
already provide substantial market power to pharmaceutical manufacturers.
111. No. 75 Civ. 5828-CSH, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17851 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 1977).
112. 542U.S.atl7l.
113. Industria Siciliana, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17851, at *30-31.
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the reciprocal transaction upon the plaint if. 4 The Supreme Court noted
that Industria Siciliana involved a "foreign injury that was dependent upon,
not independent of, domestic harm."' 5 The U.S. government subsequently
endorsed Industria Siciliana as one of three "factual scenarios that, in its view,
satisfy the narrow 'domestic injury exception"' of the FTAIA. 116
Industria Siciliana suggests two characteristics establishing jurisdiction
due to inextricably linked foreign and domestic effects: (1) simultaneity and
(2) interdependence between the foreign and domestic harms such that neither
could have arisen absent the other. In the cartel context, as discussed
previously, a cartel raises prices simultaneously in all of the markets in which
it operates. The domestic and foreign harms thus arise simultaneously.
Moreover, so long as arbitrage is possible, the foreign and domestic harms are
interdependent. The foreign harm could not arise absent the domestic harm,
and the domestic harm could not arise absent the foreign harm. As in Industria
Siciliana, the foreign and domestic harms are intertwined,' 1 7 inextricably
bound up with one another such that a lawsuit to deter the foreign harm helps
deter the domestic harm.
Regrettably, the Supreme Court stepped back from fully endorsing this
basis for jurisdiction. It instead referenced "but-for causation" when it
remanded the case to the'D.C. Circuit Court:
Respondents contend that, because vitamins are fungible and readily transportable,
without an adverse domestic effect (i.e., higher prices in the United States), the sellers
could not have maintained their international price-fixing arrangements and respondents
would not have suffered their foreign injury. They add that this "but for" condition is
sufficient to bring the price-fixing conduct within the scope of the FTAIA's exception...
114. Id. at *31 (emphasis added).
115. 542 U.S. at 172. The Supreme Court did not point out that the domestic harm was equally
dependent upon the foreign injury. Industria Siciliana clearly establishes that the conduct that caused the
inextricable domestic and foreign harms occurred in Italy when the foreign plaintiff accepted the terms
of the tying arrangement. "[Pilaintiff claims that [the defendants] thereupon conspired and combined to
coerce [the plaintiff] into foregoing the more advantageous engineering proposal" through a tying
arrangement. Industria Siciliana, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17851, at *3; see also id. at *4 (describing the
acceptance of the tying arrangement and the rejection of the American firm's lower bid as a "condition
precedent"); id. at *5 ("Upon its signature to this contract, [the plaintiff] became irrevocably committed
to [the defendant] and withdrew from further discussion with [the harmed American firm].").
116. Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., 417 F.3d 1267, 1269-70 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
The government endorsed a second fact scenario in which a court found subject matter jurisdiction
because the foreign and domestic harms were inextricably linked. In Caribbean Broadcasting System
Ltd v. Cable and Wireless PLC, 148 F.3d 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1998), the plaintiff was a foreign radio station
operating in the Eastern Caribbean. It alleged that the defendants attempted to monopolize FM
broadcasting in the Eastern Caribbean, particularly with respect to English-language advertising. The
court found it had subject matter jurisdiction over the claims because American consumers (advertisers)
suffered domestic harm from the attempted monopolization. "Paying higher prices is certainly a direct
harm to customers.... In this context it appears that antitrust injury to [the plaintiff] is ultimately a harm
to U.S. purchasers of radio advertising. By keeping [the foreign plaintiff] out of the market, [the
defendants] denied such [domestic] purchasers the benefit of competition." Id. at 1087.
117. Other commentators have referred to the intertwined effects. See Hannah L. Buxbaum,
National Courts, Global Cartels: F. Hoffinan-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran, S.A. (U.S. Supreme Court
2004), 5 GERMAN L.J. No. 9 1095, 1104-05 (2004), available at
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=494 ("The foreign plaintiffs in Empagran had argued
that the cartel's effects on U.S. commerce were in fact intertwined with the foreign injury."); Wolfgang
Wurmnest, Foreign Private Plaintiffs, Global Conspiracies, and the Extraterritorial Application of U.S.
Antitrust Law, 28 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 205, 225-26 (2005).
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. The Court of Appeals may determine whether respondents properly preserved the
argument, and, if so, it may consider it and decide the related claim."?
But-for causation with respect to the effects of international cartels is
economically unsound. Causation requires a precipitating action that produces
a subsequent effect. The cause is also separate and independent from the
effect. In contrast, cartels raise their prices in all markets simultaneously, and
their foreign and domestic effects are interdependent. The cartel's domestic
effect can never "cause" its foreign effect, nor can the foreign effect "cause"
the domestic effect. The two are inseparable aspects of the overarching global
effect of the cartel's activities. Fortunately, two district courts have looked
past the Supreme Court's unfortunate but-for language to find subject matter
jurisdiction due to intertwined foreign and domestic harms.
The first case was MM Global Services Inc. v. Dow Chemical
Company.119 The Indian plaintiff alleged that the defendants forced it to
participate in a resale price maintenance scheme. The Indian firm "refused to
accept orders or cancelled accepted orders if the prospective resale prices to
end-users in India were below certain levels."' 20 The plaintiffs alleged that
this scheme prevented them from "effectively and fully competing and
maximizing their sales of [p]roducts."' 2' The arrangement harmed the U.S.
domestic market because "competition in the sale and resale of [Union
Carbide] [p]roducts in and from the United States was improperly diminished
and restrained .... 122 The defendants argued that the plaintiffs did not meet
the FTAIA's requirements because the plaintiffs had not argued that the
domestic effects of the scheme directly caused their harms in India. 123 Without
explicitly discussing the plaintiffs foreign harms and the domestic harms as
intertwined, the court nevertheless implied such a link when it wrote that it
"[did] not agree with the defendants that it is inconceivable for both domestic
effects to give rise to the plaintiffs' injuries and for those injuries to also affect
domestic commerce."'124 As in Industria Siciliana, MM Global Systems
represents conduct in which the foreign and domestic harms arose
simultaneously and in an interdependent manner, such that the domestic harm
(increased prices) and the foreign harm (reduced sales) could not have arisen
separately.
Another district court explicitly considered jurisdiction due to
inextricably linked effects. In re. Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust
Litigation 15 involved foreign plaintiffs alleging that the defendants engaged
in a global cartel in monosodium glutamate ("MSG") that caused them to pay
supra-competitive prices in their wholly foreign transactions. The plaintiffs
alleged that the supra-competitive prices they paid abroad "were inextricably
118. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 175.
119. 329 F. Supp. 2d 337 (D. Conn. 2004).
120. Id. at 340.
121. Id. at 342.
122. Id.
123. See id. ("[P]lantiffs have built their case around the proposition that Indian resale price
maintenance led to higher prices in the United States, not the other way around.").
124. Id. at 343.
125. 2005 U.S. Dist LEXIS 8424 (D. Minn. May 2, 2005).
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linked" to the supra-competitive prices paid in the United States. 126 Although
the court still evaluated the foreign and domestic effects in causal terms, 127 the
court found the following:
Plaintiffs allege that they were direct purchasers of overpriced MSG and/or nucleotides
who were forced to pay inflated prices from abroad because Defendants' conspiracy
prevented them from buying competitively priced MSG and/or nucleotides from the
United States. Plaintiffs also allege that the injury was direct and was specifically
intended by Defendants. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that their injury
arose from the United States effects of Defendants' anti-competitive actions. 128
Though some courts have recognized the conceptual utility of
inextricably linked foreign and domestic harms as a basis for jurisdiction, the
D.C. Circuit has not, perhaps because the Supreme Court remanded
Empagran in terms of but-for causation. In its remanded Empagran opinion
("Empagran I,), 129 the D.C. Circuit held that but-for causation was
insufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction. The court began its
opinion by incorrectly summarizing the facts of Industria Siciliana. The court
wrote that the "reciprocal tying agreement effected the exclusion of the
American rival of one defendant, resulting in higher consumer prices" to the
foreign plaintiff.130 This statement conflicts with the clear record in Industria
Siciliana that the underlying transaction occurred in Italy. 131 The court's
incorrect reading of Industria Siciliana allowed it to conclude, with respect to
Empagran, that "[t]he foreign injury caused by the appellees' conduct, then,
was not 'inextricably bound up with.., domestic restraints of trade."'
132
Having dispensed with the concept of inextricably bound up effects, the
court addressed but-for causation. In two sentences lacking explanation and
analysis other than what the foreign plaintiffs "acknowledged at oral
argument,"'' 33 the court concluded that the FTAIA's "statutory language-
'gives rise to'-indicates a direct causal relationship, that is, proximate
causation, and is not satisfied by the mere but-for 'nexus." 134 The D.C. Circuit
viewed the foreign price increase and the domestic price increase as separable
rather than two aspects of the same global effect. "It was the foreign effects of
price-fixing outside of the United States that directly caused or 'gave rise to'
the appellants' losses when they purchased vitamins abroad at supra-
competitive prices."' 35 Thus the D.C. Circuit, without referencing Den
Norske, essentially adopted its holding: U.S. courts only have jurisdiction over
foreign claims for foreign harms caused by international cartels when the
foreign harm was directly caused by the domestic harms.
When the Supreme Court considers this matter again, as it almost
certainly will, it should fully endorse inextricably linked foreign and domestic
126. Id. at *3.
127. Seeid. at*14.
128. Id. at *22.
129. Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., 417 F.3d 1267 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
130. Id. at 1270.
131. See supra note 115.
132. 417 F.3d at 1271.
133. Id. at 1270.
134. Id. at 1271.
135. Id. at 1271.
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effects as a basis for jurisdiction in Empagran-type cases. Such a basis for
jurisdiction can be reconciled with the language of the FTAIA. First, it is not
much of a conceptual leap to say that when two harms are inextricably linked,
they "give rise to" each other. They are not separable into one effect that
causes the other effect; they are intertwined such that neither effect could have
arisen without the other. This interpretation may not meet a "more natural
reading"'136 of the FTAIA, but the Supreme Court's unanimous Empagran
opinion explicitly favored reading the FTAIA in a manner meeting the Court's
policy goals:
At most, respondents' linguistic arguments might show that respondents' reading is the
more natural reading of the statutory language. But those arguments do not show that we
must accept that reading. And that is the critical point.... [W]e believe that the statute's
language permits the reading that we give it.
13 7
Similarly, the Court should not let poor syntax stand in the way of sound
economics. Instead, it should clearly enunciate a basis for jurisdiction that is
economically sound: domestic effects "give rise to" foreign effects when the
domestic and foreign effects are inextricably bound up with one another.
The Supreme Court can endorse jurisdiction based on intertwined
foreign and domestic effects without fear that the U.S. courts will be
overwhelmed with Empagran-type suits. A foreign plaintiff must still show
that there was a "direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable" domestic
effect from the cartel that led to "a [domestic] claim." The courts could
require that foreign plaintiffs seeking U.S. jurisdiction over Empagran-type
suits (1) follow a DOJ conviction against the cartel; 138 (2) follow a domestic
plaintiffs successful lawsuit; or (3) file their lawsuit concurrently with
domestic plaintiffs.1 39 I believe all three scenarios should be permitted to
maximize the ability of foreign plaintiffs to identify international cartels that
would otherwise go undetected in the United States. Regardless of which
option is chosen, my point is that the courts will still be able to establish a
restrictive threshold for exercising jurisdiction in Empagran-type suits within
the language of the FTAIA.
IV. UNRESOLVED ISSUES
So long as the courts do not deny jurisdiction to all foreign plaintiffs in
Empagran-type cases, two important concerns raised by the amici briefs
submitted to the Supreme Court in Empagran must be addressed. The first is
the policy concern that U.S. jurisdiction in Empagran-type cases will
undermine government amnesty programs. The United States has led the
world in creating an effective amnesty program that encourages cartel
members to expose their cartels by creating a winner-takes-all Prisoner's
Dilemma. Other governments have created similar programs, and the United
136. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 174.
137. Id.
138. This first option would have permitted jurisdiction in Den Norske, Kruman, and
Empagran, but not in MM Global Servs. and Monosodium Glutamate.
139. A fourth option, that the foreign plaintiff show that there was a domestic effect somewhere
to someone, was essentially the basis for jurisdiction articulated in Kruman and overruled in Empagran.
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States and foreign governments feared that U.S. jurisdiction over Empagran-
type suits would undermine the effectiveness of these programs. The second
concern is a legal one: because American courts are perceived to be more
favorable to plaintiffs, if the United States exercises jurisdiction in Empagran-
type cases, foreign plaintiffs will bring their antitrust suits in the United States
even when suitable fora exist in their home countries. The governments feared
such forum shopping would undermine the antitrust regimes of foreign
governments, overwhelm the U.S. court system, and threaten the cooperation
that the United States and these governments have fostered with respect to
international cartels.
A. Effects on Government Amnesty Policies
Amnesty programs succeed by taking advantage of the secrecy and
distrust inherent in cartels through the dynamics of the Prisoner's Dilemma.
140
The Prisoner's Dilemma models collusive behavior threatened by government
prosecution. The model involves two criminals who are arrested by the police.
The police can only convict the criminals if one or both confesses. If both
confess, they each receive a moderate sentence, such as four years in prison
(see Chart 1). If only one confesses, the confessor receives a light sentence,
such as only one year in prison, ,while the other receives the most severe
punishment, such as a ten-year sentence. The optimal decision for both
prisoners is to work together and not confess. However, the police interrogate
the criminals separately so that even if they agree to not confess, the criminals
cannot be assured that each will abide by their agreement. The rational
criminal must therefore decide whether to confess (and thereby break the
criminals' agreement) by considering the risk the other criminal will confess
and the consequences of him doing so. For example, if criminal A believes
there is a 50% chance that criminal B will break the agreement and confess,
then criminal A faces a sentence of 2.5 years if he confesses and a sentence of
five years if he does not confess (see "Example Explanation" accompanying
Chart 1). Both the sentence structure, and the uncertainty of what the other
collaborator will do, lead Criminal A (and Criminal B) to decide that his
optimal action is to confess. Confessing is the optimal decision even though
Criminal A will receive a punishment, albeit a relatively light one.
140. See Evenett et al., supra note 10, at 14; see also Leslie, supra note 45, at 515; Jason D.
Medinger, Comment, Antitrust Leniency Programs: A Call for Increased Harmonization as
Proliferating Programs Undermine Deterrence, 52 EMORY L.J. 1439 (2003).
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CHART 1. THE PAY-OUT STRUCTURE FOR EACH CRIMINAL IN
A PRISONER'S DILEMMA
Criminal B
Does Not Confess Confess
Does Not A = 0 yrs (no penalty) A = 10 yrs (severe penalty)
Criminal A Confess B = 0 yrs (no penalty) B = 1 yr (light penalty)
Confess A = I yr (light penalty) A = 4 yrs (moderate penalty)B = 10 yrs (severe penalty) B = 4 yrs (moderate penalty)
Example Explanation:
If Criminal A believes there is a 50% chance that Criminal B will break their agreement
and confess, Criminal A's probable sentences are:
If Criminal A confesses: (.50)*(l yr) + (.50)*(4 yrs) = 2.5 yrs
- If Criminal A does not confess: (.50)*(0 yrs) + (.50)*(10 yrs) = 5 yrs
Criminal A's optimal decision, given the uncertainty of what Criminal B will do, is to
confess.
Amnesty programs for cartel informants attempt to create a real-world
Prisoner's Dilemma. After a cartel is formed, its members continually face the
choice of either remaining in the cartel or leaving it and seeking amnesty.
Participating in amnesty programs has two costs: (1) the opportunity cost of
leaving the cartel (the member's lost future supra-competitive profits), and (2)
the expected cost from the civil liability that the amnesty participant still
faces. Continuing in the cartel has two costs: (1) the expected cost of criminal
liability, and (2) the expected cost of civil liability (which includes the lost
future supra-competitive profits from the point when the cartel is discovered).
Unlike the costs of participating in the amnesty program, which are certain,
the costs of continuing in the cartel are uncertain. They depend on the
probability that the cartel will be detected through the amnesty program or
other means. 141
Governments can encourage firms to seek amnesty through a variety of
mechanisms. For example, governments can reduce the amnesty program's
participation costs, as the United States recently did when it limited the
liability of amnesty participants to compensatory damages while retaining the
treble damages regime for other cartel members. 42 Governments can also
increase the expected costs of continuing in the cartel, such as by allocating
more resources to the enforcement of their antitrust laws against international
cartels. 43 If the expected cost of seeking amnesty (the lost future cartel profits
plus the reimbursement of past cartel profits) is less than the expected cost of
continuing in the cartel (facing the full civil and criminal penalties of the
141. The cartel may be detected through private litigation by the cartel's consumers or other
law enforcement efforts. For example, the United States government "profiles" cartels to target its
investigations.
142. Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-237,
118 Stat. 665 (2004) (current version at 15 U.S.C.A. § I (West 2005)).
143. Evenett et al. explore the law-and-economics approach to amnesty programs and cartel
sanctions in more detail. See Evenett et al., supra note 10, at 13-18.
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antitrust laws as well as some lost future profits), members will confess and
seek amnesty.
Amnesty programs extend the Prisoner's Dilemma one step further by
granting amnesty (the equivalent of a light sentence) only to the first criminal
who confesses. As Chart 2 demonstrates, the winner-takes-all dynamic
increases the incentive for a criminal to confess. It also modifies the decision
calculus as Criminal A must not only consider whether Criminal B will
confess, but also whether Criminal B will confess and receive amnesty first. A
winner-takes-all dynamic increases the incentive for a criminal to confess, and
it adds a time component to the decision. If all cartel members face these same
costs and are risk-neutral, each has a strong incentive to be the firm that
exposes the cartel, provoking a "rush to the courthouse."' 44 Cartel members
try to secure the advantages of the amnesty program first,145 which in turn
increases the likelihood that the cartel will be exposed.
CHART 2. THE PAY-OUT STRUCTURE OF A WINNER-TAKES-ALL
PRISONER'S DILEMMA
Criminal B
Does Not Confess Confess
Does Not A = 0 yrs (no penalty) A = 10 yrs (severe penalty)
Criminal A Confess B = 0 yrs (no penalt B = I (light penalty)
A = 1 yr (light penalty)
Confess B = 10 yrs (severepenalty)
Example Explanation:
If Criminal A believes there is a 50% chance that Criminal B will confess, the
winner-takes-all dynamic increases the differential between Criminal A's probable
sentences:
- If Criminal A confesses first: (.50)*(1 yr) = 0.5 yrs
- If Criminal A does not confess first: (.50)*(0 yrs) + (.50)*(10 yrs) = 5 yrs
Criminal A has a greater incentive to confess than he does in the example detailed
in Chart 1.
144. Cartel members need to know that it is rational for at least one other member of the cartel
to seek amnesty at the other firm's great expense. The more general point is that cartel members do not
need to fear that the cartel will be discovered by public or private investigations.
145. See Gary R. Spratling, Making Companies an Offer They Shouldn't Refuse: The Antitrust
Division's Corporate Leniency Program-An Update, Presentation at the Bar Association of the District
of Columbia's 35th Annual Symposium on Associations and Antitrust 3 (Feb. 16, 1999), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/2247.pdf [hereinafter Spratling Presentation] ("We frequently
see situations where a company approaches the government a few days, or even less than one full day,
after one of its conspirators has already approached the Division and secured its position as first in line
for amnesty.").
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1. United States Amnesty Programs
In 1978, the United States became the first country to institute an
amnesty program. 146 Amnesty was available to corporations that confessed to
participating in a cartel and that cooperated in the subsequent investigation.
To receive amnesty, the DOJ could not have known of the cartel prior to the
firm's confession. Even then, amnesty was conditional on prosecutorial
discretion, and if a corporation received amnesty, its executives did not.
147
This initial amnesty program presented an amnesty participant with additional
uncertain costs from those previously discussed. In addition to the lost future
cartel profits and the reimbursement of past cartel profits, an amnesty
participant would face some probability that it would still receive the full
criminal and civil penalties, including treble damages, of the antitrust laws.
The DOJ and Congress have reformed the amnesty program to eliminate
some and lower other costs of participating in the program. 148 The current
Corporate Leniency Policy offers automatic amnesty from criminal
prosecution to the first cartel member 149 who reveals the cartel's existence
before a government investigation has begun. Amnesty is now automatic so
long as the applicant meets various objective, non-discretionary conditions.
For example, the DOJ must not already know about the cartel from another
source.150 The amnesty applicant must not have started or led the cartel, and it
must stop participating in the cartel. The amnesty applicant must confess to
the wrongdoing,' 1 make restitution to victims, and provide "full, continuing
and complete cooperation" to the DOJ throughout the investigation. 152 In
return, not only does the company receive automatic amnesty from criminal
prosecution, but its liability to the cartel's victims is limited to compensatory
damages. 153 All directors, officers, and employees of the company also
receive amnesty if they admit their wrongdoing and cooperate with the DOJ's
investigation.'- 4 If the DOJ already began an investigation before the
applicant came forward, full or partial amnesty may still be available if the
government "does not yet have evidence against the [specific] company that is
likely to result in a sustainable conviction" and "granting leniency would not
be unfair to others." 55 Finally, the DOJ provides full or partial amnesty for
cartel activities for which a firm is already being investigated if the firm
146. HARD CORE CARTELS, supra note 12, at 20.
147. However, individuals could benefit from cooperating, as is the case in most criminal
investigations.
148. See supra note 28.
149. Spratling Presentation, supra note 145, at 1.
150. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIV., CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICY (1993), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0091.pdf [hereinafter CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICY].
151. Confessions must be a corporate act as opposed to isolated confessions of individual
executives or officials. Id.
152. Id.
153. See supra text accompanying note 142.
154. See CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICY, supra note 150, at 4. A second program, the Amnesty
Policy for Individuals, grams leniency to individuals who cooperate on their own behalf rather than
through their company. See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIV., LENIENCY POLICY FOR INDIVIDUALS
(1994), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/lenind.htm [hereinafter LENIENCY
POLICY FOR INDIVIDUALS].
155. See CoRPoRATE LENIENCY POLICY, supra note 150, at 2.
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discloses cartel activities in other markets in which it competes. 156 These
reforms removed the possibility of criminal liability for amnesty participants,
while reducing their civil liability.
The United States reduced the costs to amnesty participants in another
way: by ensuring that the information provided by those participants will not
be used against them in subsequent private litigation or in actions by other
governments. By using such information as grand jury materials, the DOJ
protects the firms from having their information used against them in private
litigation. 5 7 The firms are still susceptible to private litigation-for single
damages-but not based on the information they provided to the government.
Similarly, the DOJ adopted the policy that it does not share the information
from amnesty participants with foreign governments, even those cooperating
in the investigation. 15  Thus, strict confidentiality with respect to the
information provided by amnesty participants eliminates the possibility that
their participation will increase their chance of facing civil litigation or
criminal prosecution from abroad. 159
2. How the United States Increased the Cost of Continuing in a
Cartel
The United States also took steps to increase the criminal fines imposed
on cartel members.' 60  In 1987, Congress created the "alternative fine,"
allowing the government to fine cartel members "up to twice the gross gain or
twice the gross loss" to society of their illegal activity.' 6' The 1991 United
States Sentencing Guidelines encouraged courts to impose these much higher
fines through a flexible points system that allows courts to weigh additional
156. The government encourages harsher sentences for companies that know of a second
offense and do not report it. Scott D. Hammond, When Calculating the Costs and Benefits of Applying
for Corporate Amnesty, How Do You Put a Price Tag on an Individual's Freedom?, Presentation at the
Fifteenth Annual National Institute on White Collar Crime 6 (Mar. 8, 2001), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/7647.pdf [hereinafter Hammond Speech]; see also Spratling
Presentation, supra note 145, at 6 ("Roughly half of these [30 international cartel investigations] were
initiated as a result of evidence developed during an investigation of a completely separate market.").
Evenett et al. credit the Amnesty Plus program with setting "off a 'domino' effect in which one cartel
investigation can result in evidence for subsequent investigations." Evenett et al., supra note 10, at 15.
157. See ANTITRUST FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 180.
158. See Spratling Presentation, supra note 145, at 5 ("In the final analysis, the Division's
overriding interest in protecting the viability of the Amnesty Program has resulted in a policy of not
disclosing to foreign antitrust agencies information obtained from an amnesty applicant unless the
amnesty applicant agrees first to the disclosure .... [T]here is no doubt that amnesty applications would
dry up if the Division took a different position.").
159. See HARD CORE CARTELS, supra note 12, at 22 ("The need for this confidential treatment
is obvious. Without it, would-be applicants would be much less willing to come forward, and it also
increases the uncertainty among the conspirators about whether, or when, one of their fellow
conspirators might have defected.").
160. See generally Baker, supra note 26 (providing an historical overview of the use of
criminal penalties for antitrust violations).
161. See 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (2000). Because not all cartels are discovered and prosecuted, to
achieve maximum deterrence, "[m]any experts contend [that] ... the total fine against the participating
organizations should exceed the gain that they realised from the cartel. If, for example, the chances that
any given cartel would be discovered and punished were one in three, then a fine.that would provide an
adequate deterrent would have to be three times the actual gain realised by the cartel. Some believe that
as few as one in six or seven cartels are detected and prosecuted, implying a multiple of at least six. A
multiple of three is more commonly cited." HARD CORE CARTELS, supra note 12, at 27.
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factors to increase or decrease the fine imposed. The total fines in the two
years of 1997 and 1998 were nearly equal to the total fines imposed in the
twenty years prior (1976 to 1996). 16' The average criminal fine in 1998 was
fifteen times higher than the average criminal fine in 1996,163 and it is likely
to rise further now that Congress has increased the maximum fine to $100
million.'64
The United States also increased the penalties that can be assessed
against individuals, and it demonstrated a much greater willingness to impose
those penalties. Penalties against individuals both deter future cartel
activities 165 and help identify existing cartels.' 66 An individual has the greatest
incentive to come forward and provide evidence of corporate misconduct
when he perceives his interests as separate from those of the corporation. The
government has tried to foster this perception by "carving out" of its corporate
plea agreements the dispositions of officers, directors, and employees.167 To
avoid criminal indictment, those individuals must enter their own plea
agreements. 68 Of course, a policy deters only when it is enforced. Penalizing
individuals became a much stronger deterrent after the United States adopted
the Sentencing Guidelines, which helped overcome the reluctance of federal
judges to sentence business executives to prison.' 69 In fiscal years 1999 and
2000, "[a]pproximately 50 individuals were imprisoned for antitrust and
related offenses ...which [was] more than the total number of individual
defendants imprisoned in the previous five years combined."'
170
The threat of imprisonment has been particularly effective with respect
to international cartels. 17 1 Although foreign firms may be able to avoid paying
fines, the threat of criminal sanctions against their executives is much more
disruptive. 172 When an indicted official refuses to appear in U.S. court, the
government labels him an international fugitive. This designation means the
individual can be arrested, detained, and held for trial upon entry into the
United States or any country with which the United States has an extradition
treaty that covers antitrust offenses.' 73 Criminal penalties assessed against
individuals can be extremely disruptive to the operations of multinational
162. See Spratling Presentation, supra note 145.
163. Id.
164. See supra note 29.
165. See Hammond Speech, supra note 156.
166. The dynamic of evidence provided by an individual in an antitrust conspiracy is described
in Baker, supra note 26, at 708-09. He observes that individuals turn over evidence out of fear and a
desire for revenge, and that a crucial component of this work is the use of the secret federal grand jury.
167. Hammond Speech, supra note 156, at 9-10.
168. See Baker, supra note 26, at 705 ("This perceived risk of incarceration is critical. As one
very senior corporate executive [said] ... 'as long as you are only talking about money, the company
can at the end of the day take care of me... but once you begin talking about taking away my liberty,
there is nothing that the company can do for me."').
169. See id. at 705-06.
170. Hammond Speech, supra note 156, at 8-9 (emphasis omitted).
171. Baker notes that, "[m]eanwhile, in the rest of the world, there have been very few
prosecutions of individuals," and "[t]he United States has tried hard to raise the stakes for foreign
executives residing outside of the United States." Baker, supra note 26, at 707.
172. In 1999 and 2000, the United States indicted foreign nationals from Germany, Belgium,
the Netherlands, England, France, Switzerland, Italy, Canada, Mexico, Japan, and Korea. Six are now
serving time. Hammond Speech, supra note 156, at 9-10.
173. Id.
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corporations, 174 and the United States has exploited that disruption by refusing
to plea down imprisonment for individuals associated with foreign
corporations in international cartels. The threat of personal prosecution has
been particularly important because individuals associated with international
cartels may provide the best information about the cartels, including evidence
that otherwise would be located abroad.
1 75
3. Foreign Amnesty Programs and Criminal Sanctions
Other jurisdictions have followed the United States's lead and created
their own amnesty programs and increased the sanctions against cartel
members. 176 The European Commission created its amnesty program in
1996.177 Initially, the program graduated leniency based on whether the
corporation provided "decisive evidence" and whether it came forward before
the Commission had begun an investigation.178 The Commission's program
allowed for substantial prosecutorial discretion, thereby increasing an
applicant's potential costs. In 2002, the Commission reformed the program,
bringing it more in line with the United States's approach. Now, full amnesty
is automatically provided to the first cartel member who comes forward, and
in certain circumstances immunity is available after the Commission initiates
an investigation. 179 Many countries have started or are planning to start similar
amnesty programs.180 Lagging behind this development is an increase in
national sanctions against cartel members, thoug certain countries have
improved that aspect of their enforcement as well.'
8
174. Id.
175. See HARD CORE CARTELS, supra note 12, at 30 ("Sanctions against natural persons...
may stimulate one or more individuals to offer their co-operation in circumstances in which their
employer is not inclined to enter a leniency programme. In this way, strong sanctions can be thought of
as creating a 'virtuous circle.' They create incentives for cartel operators to co-operate with
investigations, which generates more prosecutions, which generate more and heavier sanctions, which
both enhances deterrence and prompts offers of co-operation in other cases, and so forth.").
176. See Evenett et al., supra note 10, at 18 ("Consequently, corporate leniency programmes
have been revised or introduced in several countries, international norms for and reforms of cartel
enforcement have been proposed at the OECD, and bilateral cooperation developed between a few
jurisdictions. Much of this change has its origins in the events that followed the revision of the U.S.
corporate leniency programme in 1993.").
177. HARD CORE CARTELS, supra note 12, at 21.
178. A corporation that submitted "decisive evidence" before an investigation had begun
received leniency of 75% to 100% of the criminal fine. The 75% threshold was automatic, but the 100%
threshold could only be obtained at the European Commission's discretion. If a corporation came
forward after the Commission began an investigation, it could only receive leniency between 50% and
75% of the criminal fine. A corporation that provided less useful evidence or that came forward much
later in the process could only receive leniency of 10-50%. Id.
179. Id. at 22.
180. See id. at 23 ("Other countries that have recently implemented leniency programmes or
are in the process of doing so are Australia, Brazil, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Ireland,
Korea, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.").
181. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., REPORT ON THE NATURE AND IMPACT OF
HARD CORE CARTELS AND SANCTIONS AGAINST CARTELS UNDER NATIONAL COMPETITION LAWS 12
(2003) ("There is a clear trend in several countries toward stronger sanctions in cartel cases, and other
countries are reviewing their laws and policies to provide for enhanced sanctions against cartels."); id. at
17 ("The trend toward more rigorous sanctions in cartel cases is uneven-in some countries sanctions
continue to be minimal-but it is unmistakable.").
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4. Amnesty Program Successes
According to the OECD, "[e]xperience has shown that a properly
structured leniency programme can dramatically increase the success of an
anti-cartel effort."'' 1 2  The DOJ has identified and prosecuted more
international cartels due to these policies than all of its other police techniques
combined. 183 After the policies were formally instituted in 1993, amnesty
applications increased more than ten-fold from an average of one per year to
one per month. 184 The DOJ believes these programs are "unquestionably, the
single greatest investigative tool available to anti-cartel enforcers." Other
countries have similarly praised their amnesty programs. 8 6 Thus, the OECD
concludes, "[i]n recent years leniency programmes have brought about
successful prosecutions of many large, high profile cartels that would not
otherwise have been discovered."'
' 87
5. The Governments'Fears Regarding the Amnesty Programs
In its amicus brief in Empagran, the U.S. government expressed its fear
that granting U.S. jurisdiction for suits by foreign plaintiffs for foreign injuries
would decrease participation in its amnesty programs by making such
participation more costly. Permitting such suits:
would tilt the scale for conspirators against seeking amnesty by expanding the scope of
their potential civil liability. Faced with joint and several liability for coconspirators'
illegal acts all over the world, a conspirator could not readily quantify its potential
liability. The prospect of civil liability to all global victims would provide a significant
disincentive to seek amnesty from the government.1
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The seven foreign governments also expressed concern that private suits
would undermine their amnesty programs. These governments particularly
feared America's treble-damage regime. The Canadian argument was
emblematic of these foreign governments' fears. Granting jurisdiction in
Empagran-type cases would give cartel members:
less incentive to make a voluntary disclosure to Canadian authorities, because criminal
immunity from Canadian authorities would come at the increased cost of punitive treble
damages under U.S. law for its worldwide transactions. This threat of treble damages
may make it too expensive for many cartel members to cooperate, which potentially risks
182. HARD CoRE CARTELS, supra note 12, at 20.
183. See Hammond Speech, supra note 156, at 2 ("The Amnesty Program has been responsible
for determining and prosecuting more antitrust violations than all of our search warrants, consensual-
monitored audio or video tapes, and cooperating informants combined.").
184. Evenett et al., supra note 10, at 18. Evenett et al. also write that "the revision of the U.S.
corporate leniency programme in 1993 . . . led to a dramatic increase in international cartel
prosecutions." Id.
185. Id.
186. Canada describes its program as a "singular success." Canada Amicus Brief, supra note
21, at 12. Ireland describes its program as "spectacularly successful." United Kingdom Amicus Brief,
supra note 21, at 11.
187. HARD CORE CARTELS, supranote 12, at20.
188. United States Amicus Brief, supra note 22, at 20-21.
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a significant diminution in the effectiveness of the disclosure and immunity programs
upon which Canadian antitrust enforcement has successfully relied.' 89
In Part VI, I show that these fears are greatly overstated, largely driven
by the specific design of the amnesty programs, and can be overcome by
structuring these programs to better account for the characteristics of
international cartels.
B. Forum Shopping
Seven foreign governments1 90 submitted briefs to express their concern
that if the United States allowed foreign plaintiffs to bring antitrust lawsuits
for foreign injuries, it "would provide substantial encouragement for
widespread forum shopping."' 191 Over the past twenty years the world has
experienced a significant convergence in competition laws, particularly as
they relate to cartels.' 92 In 2002, the OECD concluded that cartels are
"universally recognized as the most harmful of all types of anticompetitive
conduct," and that they are "condemned in all competition laws."' 93 The seven
countries that submitted amici briefs have strong anti-cartel enforcement
regimes that include a private right to seek compensation for antitrust
harms. 194 Yet, their regimes still differ from the United States's regime in
significant ways that almost invariably cause the United States to be a more
attractive forum for plaintiffs in antitrust actions (see Chart 3 below).
One of the most significant differences between the United States's
regime and those of other countries is the damage awards available to private
litigants. "No other country has adopted the United States's unique 'bounty
hunter' approach" permitting recovery of treble damages. 195 Some countries
allow plaintiffs to recover discretionary punitive damages. 196 However the
189. Canada Amicus Brief, supra note 21, at 13-14.
190. See, e.g., Germany Amicus Brief, supra note 21; United Kingdom Amicus Brief, supra
note 21; Canada Amicus Brief, supra note 21; Japan Amicus Brief, supra note 21.
191. United Kingdom Amicus Brief, supra note 21, at 6.
192. See Evenett et al., supra note 10, at 18 ("The 1990s saw a sea change in official attitudes
toward cartel enforcement. At the start of the decade, only one industrial nation--the United States-
was taking aggressive action against international cartels, and these actions were criticized by other
governments as an improper extraterritorial application of domestic antitrust laws. By decade's end,
several high profile enforcement actions have convinced policymakers in other industrial countries that
stronger measures against international cartels ought to be taken.").
193. RECOMMENDATION OF THE OECD COUNCIL, supra note 37, at 5.
194. Yet in a cross-country comparison of private compensatory damage regimes, the OECD
concluded, "the laws of several OECD countries provide for the recovery of such damages, but the
remedy is seldom invoked, save in the United States." HARD CORE CARTELS, supra note 12, at 29. The
OECD did note that several countries were strengthening these regimes, including Japan, New Zealand,
and the United Kingdom. Id.
195. United Kingdom Amicus Brief, supra note 21, at 13.
196. For example, New Zealand conducted a review of private damage actions against cartels.
The review noted that "[p]rivate enforcement . . . is a necessary corollary to public enforcement in
achieving an optimal deterrence to would be offenders." CARTELS: 1-ARMS AND SANCTIONS, supra note
41, at 89 (quoting the New Zealand report, Paper 3-Reforming Remedies). "The report considered both
treble damages and exemplary (punitive) damages as additional incentives, and settled on the latter,
concluding that they are likely to provide more accurate signals and to offer greater fairness." Id.
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majority of developed countries award only single damages, preferring to
deter through government prosecutions. 
197
To foreign governments, America's treble damages regime is
particularly problematic when considered in the context of other aspects of the
American judicial system that favor plaintiffs. These features include
extensive discovery, class actions, asymmetrical rules on payments of
attorneys' fees, and the presumption of private liability based on successful
government actions. 98 In addition, unlike in the United States, in other
nations judges or administrative tribunals adjudicate competition law claims.
These bodies are less likely to be persuaded to provide large damage awards,
as often occurs with American juries. 199
Because they perceive that the U.S. system favors plaintiffs to such a
greater extent, the foreign governments seem to fear that the United States
200would be the de facto forum of choice for plaintiffs everywhere. Such
forum shopping would undermine these governments' antitrust policies.2 ° '
The extreme situation would arise when a citizen of one nation sued another
citizen of the same nation for harms occurring in that nation, but in U.S.
courts and applying U.S. law.20 2 Such suits would render these governments'
economic regulations and policy choices irrelevant. 20 3 Allowing private
lawsuits in such matters would be particularly problematic because, unlike
public enforcement actions by the U.S. government, private plaintiffs would
show no sensitivity toward the concerns of foreign governments.20 4
The United States government expressed its own concerns regarding
forum shopping. The United States feared that U.S. jurisdiction over
Empagran-type cases "would be likely to burden the federal courts with a
wave of antitrust cases raising potentially complex satellite disputes. 20 5 The
197. See Canada Amicus Brief, supra note 21, at 2 ("Further, in contrast to the United States,
Canada has determined that punitive sanctions for illegal cartel behavior be imposed only through
prosecutions initiated by the Government. Civil plaintiffs are limited to the recovery of their actual
damages and associated costs. The structure of these antitrust remedies reflects Canada's sovereign
choices regarding the appropriate measures to combat anticompetitive behavior within its territory.").
198. See Germany Amicus Brief, supra note 21, at 11.
199. United Kingdom Amicus Brief, supra note 21, at 14-15.
200. See Smith Kline & French Labs. Ltd. v. Bloch, 1 W.L.R. 730, 734 (C.A. 1982) (Eng.)
("As a moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the United States. If he can only get his case
into their courts, he stands to win a fortune.").
201. See Canada Amicus Brief, supra note 21, at 14 ("The contrary, and unique, policy of the
United States permitting the recovery of treble damages in civil antitrust actions likely would prove
powerfully attractive to most Canadian plaintiffs injured by anti-competitive behavior in Canada.").
202. See id ("A sovereign's interests are most immediately involved in enforcing its own laws
against its own nationals for actions within its own territory.").
203. See id. ("Accordingly, the attractiveness of the treble damages remedy would supercede
the national policy decision by Canada that civil recovery by Canadian citizens for injuries resulting
from anti-competitive behavior in Canada should be limited to actual damages.").
204. See Buxbaum, supra note 32, at 236-37 ("[Gluidelines issued by the Antitrust Division
and the Federal Trade Commission set forth a list of factors not unlike those included in the Third
Restatement to be considered before an enforcement action is pursued. Considerations of comity, in the
sense of sensitivity to foreign interests, would therefore be taken into account by those responsible for
initiating the action .... [A]ctions by a federal agency are subject to interest balancing while actions
brought by private attorneys general-in service of the same public interests---are not.").
205. United States Amicus Brief, supra note 22, at 22. These fears were also expressed by the
Fifth Circuit in Den Norske: "Any reading of the FTAIA authorizing jurisdiction over Statoil's claims
would open United States courts to global claims on a scale never intended by Congress." Den Norske
Stat Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac Vof, 241 F.3d 420, 431 (5th Cir. 2001).
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U.S. government also feared the negative diplomatic repercussions of such
suits, especially given the increased international cooperation that had
developed with respect to international antitrust. 206 In 1999 and 2001, the
OECD conducted two surveys of its member states on international
cooperation in cartel investigations and cases. 20 7 In the 1999 survey, "[t]he
responses disclosed that there had been relatively little co-operation among
national competition agencies in cartel investigations and cases prior to
1999.,,208 The 2001 survey told a different tale. "There had been more
international cooperation in the intervening period .... [T]he most active co-
operative relationships in cartel investigations were between the European
Commission and EU Member states, the United States and Canada, the
European Commission and the United States, and Australia and New
Zealand.''2° 9 The increase in cooperation is also demonstrated by the increase
in bilateral agreements between the United States and other countries. 210 The
United States feared that permitting U.S. courts to exercise jurisdiction in
Empagran-type cases would threaten these cooperative relationships while
burdening the U.S. courts.
206. See generally United States Anicus Brief, supra note 22; Charles S. Stark, International
Cooperation in the Pursuit of Cartels, 6 GEo. MASON L. REv. 533 (1998).
207. HARD CORE CARTELS, supra note 12, at 31.
208. Id.
209. Id.
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V. PROPOSED SOLUTION
Even under the belief that U.S. antitrust policy should maximally deter
cartels to protect American consumers, the best legal-policy response may not
be to open U.S. courts to all Empagran-type suits. As the U.S. government
and foreign governments asserted in their briefs in Empagran, such litigation
could decrease deterrence if it undermined participation in government
amnesty programs. In this Part, I look more closely at this concern, and I show
that it is greatly overstated. To the degree that U.S. jurisdiction over
Empagran-type suits will decrease participation in amnesty programs, such a
result is mostly due to the structure of these programs-especially the lack of
harmonization and reciprocity among the various governments' amnesty
programs.
Yet even if amnesty programs were properly designed and harmonized
to account for international cartels, exercising U.S. jurisdiction over
Empagran-type claims could still reduce the deterrence of international
cartels. Jurisdiction over such claims could undermine the effective antitrust
policies of other countries and unnecessarily burden U.S. courts with
litigation. At the same time, closing U.S. courts to all Empagran-type cases
will almost certainly reduce deterrence. Many nations-particularly
developing nations, but also some developed nations--do not effectively
enforce their antitrust laws against international cartels, 211 or they provide
protection to domestic export cartels.212 Thus the United States requires a
remedy that distinguishes between those situations in which litigation is more
appropriately brought in another jurisdiction and those situations where no
other jurisdiction will provide the plaintiffs with the possibility of adequate
relief.
Fashioning such a remedy implicates two other foreign policy interests
of the United States. First, America has an interest in seeing that its antitrust
laws are applied consistently and predictably in order to reduce the
uncertainty regarding the cost of trading in U.S. commerce. Potential
defendants-whether domestic or foreign multinational corporations-cannot
predict their potential liability.2 13 Uncertainty also encourages foreign
211. See also Wumnnest, supra note 117, at 205 ("Outside the United States, private antitrust
enforcement is either virtually non-existent or still in the fledgling stages," and "[iln developing and
transition countries, even law enforcement by public bodies is less than assured.").
212. See Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, The Changing International Status of
Export Cartel Exemptions, 20 Am. U. INT'L L. REV. 785, 815 (2005) (noting that, of fifty-five countries
surveyed, seventeen explicitly exempt domestic export cartels from domestic antitrust laws and another
thirty-four "exempt such activity implicitly because their competition laws are silent on restrictive
activities that affect foreign markets"). Levenstein and Suslow conclude that "the construction of
domestic antitrust laws that only ban activity that harms domestic competition leaves a vacuum in which
export cartels can continue to operate with no obvious or practical institution to provide oversight or
prosecution of their activities." Id
213. See Thomas W. Dunfee & Aryeh S. Friedman, The Extra-Territorial Application of
United States Antitrust Law: A Proposal for an Interim Solution, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 883, 890-91 (1984)
("The fear of extra-territorial application of conflicting national competition laws inevitably leads to
inefficient business planning .... This problem is especially acute when the extra-territorial application
of U.S. antitrust laws is anticipated. The substantive content of U.S. antitrust law is ambiguous and
uncertain, and involves potential liability of gargantuan sums through trebled damages .... Business
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plaintiffs to try to bring lawsuits in the U.S. courts instead of other venues
because a successful suit in U.S. court can bring much greater damage
awards.21 4 Second, the United States has an interest in not becoming the
world's antitrust court. Antitrust cases are large and require a significant
amount of court resources. The United States has an interest in seeing that
other countries take on the burden of antitrust enforcement, particularly if
those countries do so in a manner that is harmonious with America's antitrust
policies.
In this Part, I review various remedies that have been proposed to
distinguish Empagran-type suits according to the effectiveness of the antitrust
regimes of the other countries whose nationals are involved in these suits. I
first argue that judicial responses-whether interest-balancing comity analysis
or the doctrine of forum non conveniens-fail to provide predictable national
rules for antitrust jurisdiction and to create an incentive for additional
harmonization of antitrust policies. Second, I show that a federal policy of
providing a rebuttable presumption of jurisdiction only provides weak
national consistency and predictability to antitrust jurisdiction, and it too fails
to encourage harmonization.
Instead, I propose that Congress enact legislation that empowers the
DOJ annually to limit jurisdiction in Empagran-type suits according to the
principles of forum non conveniens. That is, the U.S. courts would not have
jurisdiction over Empagran-types suits if the DOJ has determined that the
countries in which the plaintiff or defendant resides offer antitrust plaintiffs an
effective forum for the recovery of at least compensatory damages in their
international cartel case. Such a solution would create a consistent,
predictable, national policy on international antitrust jurisdiction. It would
also encourage harmonization as states could remove their nationals from U.S.
antitrust liability by enacting and effectively implementing policies that are
sufficiently similar to those of the United States. I conclude that this proposal
is consistent with precedents regarding the separation of powers and that it
advances the international system toward the eventual establishment of a
global antitrust regime.
A. Amnesty Policies-Domestic
The U.S. government's argument regarding its amnesty policies was that
allowing antitrust lawsuits by foreigners based on foreign transactions would
have a chilling effect on its amnesty policies-because of the size and number
of foreign claims that would result against the participating firm. This
argument is confused. It implies that the relevant comparison is between the
firm's cost of participating in the amnesty program and zero. The relevant
planning is negatively affected by this threat because multinationals cannot accurately predict whether
new methods of doing business will result in unanticipated legal problems. Risk-averse firms that
respond to such an unstable environment by taking conservative, defensive postures are likely to hamper
the efficiency of their operations. The continuing presence of these inefficiencies fiustrates the goal of
fostering a positive climate for international trade.").
214. See generally Canada Amicus Brief, supra note 21.
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decision calculus, however, compares the expected cost of participating in the
amnesty program with the expected cost of continuing in the cartel.
In considering the U.S. government's claim, the relevant comparison is
between the situation in which the cartel members do not face U.S. liability
for Empagran-type suits and the situation in which they do face such liability.
If there is no U.S. jurisdiction over Empagran-type suits, then a cartel member
who receives amnesty first faces an expected cost of lost future domestic and
foreign supra-competitive profits and compensatory damages equal to its past
domestic supra-competitive profits. Permitting U.S. jurisdiction over
Empagran-type suits increases the amnesty participant's costs by an amount
equal to the compensatory damages of their past foreign supra-competitive
profits. If the relevant comparison was to zero, such additional liability would
unambiguously create a disincentive to participate in the amnesty program.
However, the relevant comparison is not to zero; instead, it is to the
costs that the cartel members face if they continue in the cartel. If there is no
U.S. jurisdiction over Empagran-type claims, a cartel member who continues
in the cartel faces the following costs if the cartel is detected: lost foreign and
domestic future profits, criminal sanctions, and civil damages equal to three
times the member's past supra-competitive domestic profits. U.S. jurisdiction
over Empagran-type suits increases the continuing members' costs by an
amount equal to three times the member's past supra-competitive foreign
profits. Thus, U.S. jurisdiction over Empagran-type suits causes the
continuing members' liability to increase at three times the rate of the amnesty
participant.
However, unlike the increased costs to the amnesty participant, which
are certain, the increased costs to the continuing cartel members are uncertain.
The continuing cartel members costs are discounted by the probability that the
cartel will be detected-either through the amnesty program or some other
means. If the probability of detection is high enough, allowing Empagran-type
suits would widen the cost-differential between participating in the cartel and
seeking amnesty. If these probabilities are high enough, permitting U.S.
jurisdiction over Empagran-type suits would encourage greater use of the
amnesty program.
As the Empagran opinion correctly noted, the effect that U.S.
jurisdiction over Empagran-type suits will have on America's amnesty
program is an empirical matter,2 ' 5 but it is one that is context-dependent. First,
the probabilities in question are partially endogenously determined. For
example, permitting foreign plaintiffs to bring Empagran-type suits will
increase the possibility that private (foreign) plaintiffs will identify cartels that
would otherwise go undetected. Second, this empiricism is highly dependent
on the specific structure of the amnesty program. For example, the U.S.
government's claims in its amicus brief were greatly weakened when
Congress reduced the liability of all amnesty participants from treble to
compensatory damages. Indeed, perhaps the best way to ensure that
jurisdiction over Empagran-type claims strengthens America's amnesty
programs is to exempt amnesty participants from all Empagran-type suits in
215. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 169, 174 (2004).
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the United States-while still permitting compensatory damages claims from
domestic plaintiffs. Such a change would eliminate the additional cost of
Empagran-type suits to amnesty participants while still permitting such suits
to greatly increase the costs of continuing in the cartel. Thus, the empirical
result is easily manipulated by government policy. To categorically assert that
U.S. jurisdiction over Empagran-ype suits will undermine America's
amnesty programs is simply untrue.
B. Amnesty Programs-Foreign
The foreign governments' concerns regarding their amnesty programs
are somewhat different. For the most part, the foreign governments' briefs
rely on the same faulty logic as the United States's-that a firm is concerned
about the absolute costs of the amnesty program rather than the costs of
participating in the amnesty program relative to the costs of remaining in the
cartel. However, in two situations, foreign amnesty programs could be
undermined by allowing Empagran-type suits in the United States: (1) if
nationals of the country with an amnesty program could sue the participating
firm in the U.S. courts for more than they could claim in their country, 2 17 or
(2) if a firm's participation in a foreign amnesty program were to increase its
exposure to lawsuits in the United States by plaintiffs from countries other
than the one with the amnesty program.218 The first matter can be addressed
by limiting U.S. jurisdiction over Empagran-type suits to situations where the
foreign plaintiff otherwise could not receive relief for at least single damages
(a proposal I discuss in the second half of this Part). If this reform was
implemented, foreign plaintiffs from countries with amnesty programs could
not bring antitrust claims before U.S. courts for their foreign injuries if their
governments provide adequate relief for their private claims.219
The second situation-of increased exposure to other foreign plaintiffs
in the United States-is more complex. Barring U.S. jurisdiction over
Empagran-type cases does not eliminate this problem because American
plaintiffs could still sue the firm participating in the foreign amnesty program
220for treble damages. Indeed there are only two ways a participant in a
216. See, e.g., Salil K. Mehra, More Is Less: A Law-And-Economics Approach to the
International Scope of Private Antitrust Enforcement, 77 TEMP. L. REv 47, 53 (2004) ("Allowing
foreign-injured plaintiffs to sue in United States courts could lead to more violators seeking amnesty...
.11).
217. Much of the foreign governments' concern focused on the treble damages regime. But the
amount and form of damages would not affect a firm's decision to participate in foreign amnesty
programs-except to the degree that, absent collective amnesty across countries, a firm would choose
the United States's amnesty program over another country's because it would thereby avoid greater
exposure to lawsuits.
218. This discussion is predicated on the view that, for the U.S. courts to have jurisdiction
under the FTAIA, there must be domestic effects of the cartel activity and domestic plaintiffs or a DOJ
criminal action preceding or concurrent with the foreign lawsuit.
219. The United States should also refuse jurisdiction to foreign plaintiffs if the foreign
government's amnesty policy completely eliminates civil liability for participating firms. Such a policy
reflects a different weighting of how an amnesty program can achieve deterrence, punishment, and
compensation of victims.
220. However, access for foreign plaintiffs could create more of a disincentive in certain
situations-namely when the size of claims by foreign plaintiffs is much greater than that of domestic
plaintiffs.
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foreign amnesty program can be exposed to greater liability in the United
States. First, the foreign government could fail to maintain the confidentiality
of the firm's identity and the information it provides. Second, the United
States could fail to recognize the foreign government's grant of amnesty, or it
could instead provide amnesty to a different cartel participant, if to any at
all. 221
The problem that Empagran-type suits present with respect to foreign
amnesty programs is therefore one of program design. The best policy
solution would be to harmonize amnesty programs so amnesty participants are
guaranteed confidentiality around the world.2 2  That policy change may
require substantial legal reforms-implicating procedural law far removed
from antitrust-and it would be difficult to achieve. A second-best approach
would be for the various governments to standardize their amnesty programs'
applications and processes so that the same participant could receive
amnesty.223 Such multinational amnesty would reduce the uncertainty-and
therefore the cost-associated with participating in the programs. The more
countries that grant amnesty to the same cartel member, the lower an amnesty
recipient's penalty will be relative to the other cartel members. Thus, as in the
domestic situation, proper design of amnesty programs will enable U.S.
jurisdiction over Empagran-type suits to strengthen the incentive for firms to
participate in amnesty programs.
B. Forum Shopping
Even if the United States and other governments harmonize and reform
their amnesty programs to better account for international cartels, U.S.
jurisdiction over Empagran-type lawsuits could still undermine the deterrence
of international cartels if it results in widespread forum shopping. The United
States must therefore distinguish between the situations in which U.S.
jurisdiction increases deterrence-by providing a forum to litigate against
international cartel members when no other forum exists-and the situations
in which U.S. jurisdiction will decrease deterrence-by undermining the
effective antitrust regimes of other countries and needlessly expending the
scarce resources of America's judiciary. Three mechanisms have been
proposed to distinguish between these two situations.
221. In this case, the amnesty participant presumably would weigh the costs and benefits of the
various amnesty programs and levels of exposure to civil suits and pick the jurisdiction that would
provide maximum protection.
222. Such a reform requires substantial legal changes as well as trust between the governing
authorities that information shared will not be used for trade competition purposes. Neither condition
exists at the present time. See Evenett et al., supra note 10, at 20.
223. See Evenett et al., supra note 10, at 23 ("[A] provision should be introduced so that firms
can simultaneously apply for leniency in multiple jurisdictions and have those applications evaluated on
the totality of the evidence of cartelisation presented."); see also Medinger, supra note 140, at 1480
("Despite the initial success of leniency policies, their continued effectiveness is threatened by the rise
of numerous competing policies with differing requirements that do not give recognition to other
nations' grants of immunity.... Only by harmonizing national policies and granting reciprocal effect in
one jurisdiction for the grant of immunity in another will the costs of applying for leniency and the
concomitant uncertainty in making leniency applications in multiple jurisdictions be decreased to the
point at which the payoff for defection from a cartel will again outweigh the payoff for continuing to
collude.").
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1. Interest-Balancing Comity Analysis
Many commentators have suggested that the U.S. courts should employ
a case-by-case interest-balancing comity analysis to address the challenge
presented by Empagran-type cases.22 Comity refers to "the rules of
politeness, convenience, and goodwill observed by states in their mutual
intercourse without being legally bound by them. 225 Principles of comity
suggest that "at some point the interests of the United States are too weak and
the foreign harmony incentive for restraint too strong to justify an
extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction., 226 Courts have invoked comity in two
types of analyses.
Prescriptive comity analysis looks at whether the legislature can
appropriately prescribe law against extraterritorial conduct of a certain type.
As the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States
explains, "a state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to
a person or activity having connections with another state when the exercise
of such jurisdiction is unreasonable., 227 Comity analysis attempts to determine
the point at which the extraterritorial application of U.S. law is unreasonable.
The analysis recognizes that "factors other than simply the effect on the
United States [should be] weighed., 228 The Restatement lists a number of
factors to consider:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state...
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the
regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity to be regulated, or
between the state and those whom the regulation is design to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the
regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the degree to
which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the
regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or economic
system;
224. See, e.g., Christopher Sprigman, Fix Prices Globally, Get Sued Locally? U.S. Jurisdiction
over International Cartels, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 265, 267 (2005) ("I suggest that . . . courts should
reintroduce an expanded analysis that incorporates comity considerations as a second filter
supplementing the effects test."); Susan E. Burnett, Comment, US. Judicial Imperialism Post Empagran
v. F. Hoffinan-LaRoche? Conflicts of Jurisdiction and International Comity in Extraterritorial Antitrust,
18 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 555, 626 (2004) (The interest-balancing approach is the proper "vehicle to
defer cases to foreign agencies [to] aid global deterrence."); Kareen O'Brien, Notes & Comments,
Giving Rise to a Claim: Is FTAIA 's Section 6A(2) an Antitrust Plaintiffs Key to the Courthouse Door?,
9 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 421, 456 (2003) ("It is in the best interests of the U.S. federal courts to apply a
comity analysis when determining whether U.S. antitrust laws apply extraterritorially.").
225. PARRY & GRANT ENCYCLOPAEDIC DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (John P. Grant &
J. Craig Barker eds., 2d ed. 2004).
226. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 609 (9th Cir. 1984).
227. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S.: LIMITATIONS ON
JURISDICTION TO PRESCRIBE § 403(1) (1987).
228. Timberlane Lumber Co., 549 F.2d at 611.
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(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the tradition of the international
system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.229
Many commentators have suggested that the Empagran opinion itself
exemplifies prescriptive comity analysis.2 30 The Court considered a certain
type of conduct-foreign antitrust harms that are independent of domestic
antitrust harms-and it determined that the United States was unreasonable in
prescribing a law to affect such conduct. Prescriptive comity analysis is thus
useful in determining whether a legislature can prescribe legislation reaching a
type of international conduct, but it is not useful in distinguishing when U.S.
jurisdiction is inappropriate with respect to certain foreign jurisdictions but
not others.
To address the inappropriate application of U.S. law in specific cases,
some courts have applied a second type of comity analysis: interest-balancing
comity analysis. Whereas prescriptive comity analysis asks whether U.S.
jurisdiction can be reasonably asserted for a certain type of cases, interest-
balancing comity analysis asks whether U.S. jurisdiction should be exercised
in a specific case. Proponents of interest-balancing comity analysis argue that
this approach "allow[s] federal courts to define with precision the
jurisdictional inquiry and weigh significant and multiple interests vested in the
outcome of the controversy" so they can "determine 'whether proceeding is
prudent under the circumstances.' ' 231 Applying interest-balancing comity
analysis, courts can explicitly recognize that "[a]n effect on United States
commerce, although necessary to the exercise of jurisdiction under the
antitrust laws, is alone not a sufficient basis on which to determine whether
American authority should be asserted in a given case as a matter of
international comity and fairness. 232 Some U.S. courts have balanced at least
some combination of the comity interests identified by the Restatement in a
case-by-case review.
133
229. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S.: LIMITATIONS ON
JURISDICTION TO PRESCRIBE § 403(2) (1987).
230. See Buxbaum, supra note 117, at 1102 ("[B]y referring to 'prescriptive comity,' [the
Court] signal[ed] acceptance of the notion that comity operates actually to limit the reach of U.S. law to
foreign conduct, and not merely as a doctrine of judicial abstention."); see also Wurmnest, supra note
117, at 220 (The Empagran decision "signals a renewed interest on the part of the Supreme Court in
using principles of comity to confine the extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust law."); Marissa
Fitzpatrick, Recent Development, Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran, S.A.: The Supreme Court
Trusts That Foreign Nations Can Preserve Competition Without American Interference, 13 TUL. J. INT'L
& CoMw. L. 357 (2005); Kenneth S. Reinker, Recent Development, Case Comment, Roche v. Empagran,
28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 297 (2004).
231. O'Brien, supra note 224, at 455 (citation omitted); see also Steven A. Kadish, Comity and
the International Application of the Sherman Act: Encouraging the Courts To Enter the Political Arena,
4 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 130 (1982).
232. Timberlane Lumber Co., 549 F.2d at 613.
233. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984);
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 610 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1979); see also Dunfee &
Friedman, supra note 213, at 905-06 ("The overlapping but not identical formulations of the relevant
criteria proposed by the circuit courts in Timberlane and Mannington Mills are extremely general and
abstract. Moreover, no guidance is provided on the relevant weight to be given the various factors.").
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After the Supreme Court's decision in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v.
California,234 interest-balancing comity analysis may no longer be good law
for resolving international antitrust cases. Hartford Fire involved American
insurance and British reinsurance companies that were accused of conspiring
to restrict trade in the American insurance market. The British reinsurers
"apparently concede[d]" jurisdiction.235 They instead argued that the United
States should decline to exercise jurisdiction due to comity. The defendants
argued that Britain had "established a comprehensive regulatory regime over
the London reinsurance market and that the conduct alleged here was
perfectly consistent with British law and policy. ' '236 The appellate court
agreed that exercising jurisdiction "would lead to significant conflict with
English law and policy. '237 The Supreme Court rejected that argument,
writing, "[t]he only substantial question.., is whether 'there is in fact a true
conflict between domestic and foreign law."'' 23' The Court held, "'[T]he fact
that conduct is lawful in the state in which it took place will not, of itself, bar
application of the United States antitrust laws,' even where the foreign state
has a strong policy to permit or encourage such conduct."239 If the Supreme
Court found that interest-balancing comity analysis was not required in a case
involving a British regulatory scheme that permitted conduct that the United
States outlawed, it is difficult to see how it would permit interest-balancing
comity analysis in Empagran-type suits in which nearly every nation has
some sort of policy banning most forms of cartel activity. Indeed, the Court
rejected interest-balancing comity analysis in its Empagran opinion.240
Where there is true conflict between the antitrust laws of two countries
with respect to cartels, it is difficult to see what guidance comity offers. For
the most part, such conflict exists when foreign nations explicitly protect their
domestic export cartels, and foreign plaintiffs sue the cartel members in U.S.
courts. Assuming that the cartel also harmed U.S. consumers and that the
foreign plaintiffs meet whatever standard is set to establish jurisdiction, such
as a prior DOJ prosecution against the foreign defendants, should the U.S.
courts decline jurisdiction out of deference to the protectionist policies of
another country? The D.C. Circuit confronted a similar situation in Laker
Airways Ltd. v. Sabena and concluded:
[Comity analysis] is unsuitable when courts are forced to choose between a domestic law
which is designed to protect domestic interests, and a foreign law which is calculated to
thwart the implementation of the domestic law in order to protect foreign interests
allegedly threatened by the objectives of the domestic law. Interest balancing in this
context is hobbled by two primary problems: (1) there are substantial limitations on the
court's ability to conduct a neutral balancing of the competing interests, and (2) the
adoption of interest balancing is unlikely to achieve its goal of promoting international
comity. 
2A
234. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
235. Id. at 795.
236. Id. at 798-99.
237. Id. at 797.
238. Id. at 799 (citations omitted).
239. Id. at 799 (citations omitted).
240. See infra notes 245-246.
241. 731 F.2d 909, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (footnotes omitted).
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Interest balancing is problematic even when there is no conflict in laws
because most of the factors of analysis cut two ways. In the context of an
Empagran-type case, whose "justified expectations" should a court consider
in evaluating whether those expectation are "protected or hurt by the
regulation"242-the foreign purchaser who was harmed, the foreign cartel
member, the domestic purchaser who was also harmed, or all three? How does
a court determine whether the U.S. antitrust laws are "consistent with the
tradition of the international system, 243 especially when the United States has
been the leader on antitrust matters? Twenty years ago, the United States
stood alone with respect to the extraterritorial application of its laws through
the effects test. That is no longer true after the European Community
recognized jurisdiction on a basis very similar to America's effects test.244
Similar questions can be asked of nearly every factor listed in the
Restatement. Even if courts knew which way these factors cut, they would
need to engage in extensive fact-finding to analyze the various factors,
something which the Empagran opinion described as "too complex to prove
workable ' 245 and likely to lead to "lengthier proceedings, appeals, and more
proceedings-to the point where procedural costs and delays could
themselves threaten interference with a foreign nation's ability to maintain the
integrity of its own antitrust enforcement system." 246 Thus, interest-balancing
comity analysis provides courts with almost no guidance in resolving
Empagran' s jurisdictional question. 247
2. Forum non conveniens
Forum non conveniens 148 is a second doctrine by which courts may be
able to determine when they should decline jurisdiction in Empagran-type
suits. Forum non conveniens is a common-law doctrine under which "a court
may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is
authorized by the letter of a general venue statute" in favor of another, more
convenient forum.24 9 The first American case to apply this doctrine was Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Gilbert. °50 A Virginia resident sued, in New York state court, a
company that had operations in New York and Virginia for a tort that
242. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S.: LIMITATIONS ON
JURISDICTION TO PRESCRIBE § 403(2)(d) (1987).
243. Id. § 403(2)(f).
244. See generally James J. Friedburg, The Convergence of Law in an Era of Political
Integration: The Wood Pulp Case and the Alcoa Effects Doctrine, 52 U. PITT. L. REv. 289 (1991).
245. F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 168 (2004).
246. Id at 168-69.
247. See Dunfee & Friedman, supra note 213, at 913 (quoting Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 948-
49) ("Pursuing these inquiries only leads to the obvious conclusion that jurisdiction could be exercised
or that there is a conflict, but does not suggest the best avenue of conflict resolution.").
248. See generally John Byron Sandage, Note, Forum Non Conveniens and the Extraterritorial
Application of United States Antitrust Law, 94 YALE L.J. 1693, 1693-94 (1985) (finding the "present
interest-based revisionist approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction of antitrust law ... incapable of
effectively resolving the tensions produced by expansive application of United States competition laws
to international transactions").
249. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947).
250. Id. Gilbert's companion case, Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947),
applied the doctrine of forum non conveniens to a plaintiff's derivative suit.
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occurred in Virginia. The New York state court had jurisdiction over the
matter, and the question was whether that court could decline to exercise it.
The Supreme Court held that courts could decline jurisdiction after
weighing a number of private and public factors. The private factors included
(1) the relative ease of access to evidence; (2) the possibility of compelling
unwilling witnesses to appear; (3) the cost of having willing witnesses appear;
(4) other practical problems "that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and
inexpensive; ' 251 and (5) the ability to enforce the judgment. The public factors
included (1) administrative difficulties due to congestion in the court docket;
(2) the burden on a jury "which has no relation to the litigation,' '252 and (3) "a
local interest in having localized controversies decided at home., 253 In
weighing these factors, the Court concluded, "unless the balance is strongly in
favor of the defendant, the plaintiffs choice of forum should rarely be
disturbed. 254
The first case to apply the Gilbert analysis to a matter involving foreign
litigants was Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno.255 Piper involved the crash of a
Pennsylvania-made plane in Scotland that killed six Scottish nationals and
residents, whose heirs and next of kin were also Scottish. A tort suit was filed
in California "because its laws regarding liability, capacity to sue, and
damages are more favorable ... ,,256 The Supreme Court considered whether
courts could apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens when "the law of the
alternate forum is less favorable to recovery than that which would be applied
by the district court.,
257
The Court held that courts could apply forum non conveniens in these
circumstances. The Piper court added a preliminary test to the Gilbert
analysis:
At the outset of any forum non conveniens inquiry, the court must determine whether
there exists an alternative forum. Ordinarily, this requirement will be satisfied when the
defendant is "amenable to process" in the other jurisdiction. In rare circumstances,
however, where the remedy offered by the other forum is clearly unsatisfactory, the other
forum may not be an adequate alternative, and the initial requirement may not be
satisfied. Thus ... dismissal would not be appropriate where the alternative forum does
not permit litigation of the subject matter of the dispute. 5 8
Regarding the deference afforded the plaintiffs choice of forum, the Court
added, "[w]hen the plaintiff is foreign, however, this assumption is much less
reasonable. Because the central purpose of any forum non conveniens inquiry
is to ensure that the trial is convenient, a foreign plaintiffs choice deserves
less deference.,
259
Although Piper involved a tort action, the principles of forum non
conveniens it articulates should be adopted by the United States in antitrust
251. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508.
252. Id. at 508-09.
253. Id. at 509.
254. Id. at 508.
255. 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
256. Id. at 240.
257. Id. at 246 n.12.
258. Id. at 254-55 n.22 (internal citation omitted).
259. Id. at 256.
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cases brought by foreign plaintiffs for foreign injuries. 26 Specifically, forum
non conveniens should be invoked when foreign plaintiffs can bring their
antitrust action and recover damages in an alternate forum that is more
convenient to them or the defendant. Piper demonstrates that the alternative
forum could not be declared "clearly unsatisfactory" due to the lack of treble
damages, the lack of a jury trial to settle the claim, or the lack of other
procedural factors benefiting the plaintiff. All of these factors were present in
Piper, and the Court explicitly held that use of forum non conveniens was
acceptable.
In most cases, the Gilbert balancing test would support invoking forum
non conveniens where the foreign plaintiff has an alternative forum to hear its
claim based on a foreign transaction.261 The private factors-regarding
evidence, witnesses, the ease of trial, and the ability to enforce judgments262 -
all would support invoking the doctrine and declining jurisdiction, especially
since the foreign plaintiffs choice of forum is deserving of "less
deference." 263 The public factors weigh more ambiguously. The deterrence
goals of the antitrust acts would likely favor exercising jurisdiction in U.S.
courts. The public factors of judicial economy and court congestion would
favor invoking forum non conveniens. Thus, unless a court viewed the
deterrence factor as paramount, it would likely refuse to exercise jurisdiction
because of forum non conveniens in cases where the foreign plaintiff had an
alternative forum to hear its claim based on a foreign transaction. In
comparison to interest-balancing comity analysis, forum non conveniens
provides greater guidance to courts regarding the evaluation of the various
public and private interests involved in Empagran-type cases.
It is not clear whether courts can invoke the doctrine of forum non
conveniens in an international antitrust action due to the Clayton Act's section
12 venue provision. In United States v. National City Lines, Inc., 264 the
Supreme Court held that courts could invoke forum non conveniens in
domestic antitrust suits. That decision rested on the general transfer
provision265 of the Rules of Federal Procedure, which "enables district courts
to transfer cases to each other for convenience and justice., 266 The National
City Lines Court held that the general transfer provision trumped the Clayton
Act's venue provision. The problem is that the general transfer provision
refers only to transfers between United States domestic courts, and "[c]ourts
disagree on what lessons to draw from this holding for international antitrust
cases." 267 In Industrial Investment Development Corp. v. Mitsui & Co.,268 the
Fifth Circuit held that "the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens is
260. Indeed, antitrust originated out of common law doctrines.
261. In my description of the Gilbert case, if "antitrust suit" replaced "tort action" and "a
foreign country" replaced "Virginia" and "United States" replaced "New York," the situations would be
identical.
262. The difficulty in enforcing antitrust judgments abroad supports invoking the doctrine
because of the blocking and clawback statutes that foreign jurisdictions have passed.
263. 454 U.S. 235, 256 (1981).
264. 337 U.S. 78 (1949).
265. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2000).
266. Bates, supra note 31, at 282-83.
267. Id. at 290.
268. 671 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 460 U.S. 1007 (1983).
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inapplicable to [international] suits brought under the United States antitrust
laws." In contrast, the Second Circuit, in Capital Currency Exchange NV v.
National Westminster Bank PLC,269 affirmed the use of forum non conveniens
in an international antitrust suit. This split in the circuits needs to be resolved
in favor of permitting courts to invoke forum non conveniens in international
antitrust suits.
3. Problems with a Judicial Response
Still, forum non conveniens is not a panacea for Empagran-type cases
for reasons that are true of any judicial response, including interest-balancing
comity analysis. These court-made doctrines require detailed, fact-specific,
case-by-case analyses by individual judges who may weigh similar facts
differently. Before a court can consider invoking forum non conveniens, it
must first determine what laws, rights, remedies, and procedures would apply
if the case were tried in the alternate forum. This inquiry requires a court to
determine whether the antitrust laws and procedures of foreign jurisdictions
are "clearly unsatisfactory," something many courts may feel ill-equipped to
judge. Precedent will often be an ineffectual guide in these factual inquiries,
given the frequent changes in the antitrust policies of foreign nations.270
The resultant inconsistency and unpredictability across the district courts
could frustrate one of the reasons for using the doctrine-to provide a clear
standard for exercising jurisdiction based on the availability of adequate relief
in other countries implicated in the litigation. With so many fact-specific
factors in play in a court's decision, neither plaintiffs nor defendants could
accurately assess how a judge will rule on jurisdiction. This uncertainty
encourages foreign plaintiffs to file antitrust suits in the United States, and it
raises the costs to defendants of doing business in the United States. A case-
by-case approach to resolving jurisdiction over Empagran-type suits will
likely lead not only to forum shopping internationally, but also venue-
shopping domestically. Because public factors are assessed and weighed in
the analysis, foreign nations will also operate in an uncertain environment.
They therefore have no reason to enact laws and policies in harmony with
those of the United States; one district court could still choose to exercise
jurisdiction over that countries' nationals. Piper's forum non conveniens
analysis articulates the principles to apply in Empagran-type suits, but its
case-by-case application fails to provide an effective, national solution to
resolve jurisdiction in Empagran-type suits.
4. The Rebuttable Presumption-and its Inadequacy
In 1984, Thomas W. Dunfee and Aryeh S. Friedman offered their own
"interim solution" to the general problem of extraterritorial application of U.S.
269. 155 F.3d 603 (2d Cir. 1998).
270. Writing of interest-balancing comity analysis, Dunfee and Friedman note, "[p]recedent is
of little value because foreign relations and policies constantly shift and change." Dunfee & Friedman,
supra note 213, at 906.
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antitrust laws in private litigation.271 They proposed Congressional legislation
amending section 4 of the Clayton Act as follows:
No United States federal court shall decline on grounds of comity, or a jurisdictional rule
of reason, to make a determination on the merits of a private treble damages suit unless
the President, in a suit against a foreign defendant and involving a foreign transaction
wherein prescriptive jurisdiction has been challenged by such a defendant, determines the
jurisdiction against the defendant(s) ought not be asserted because of the foreign policy
interests of the United States.
272
Dunfee and Friedman's proposal was modeled after the Hickenlooper
Amendment, which "barred the U.S courts from applying the act of state
defense in certain foreign expropriation cases unless . . . the President
informed the court that consideration of the defense was essential for foreign
policy reasons., 273 Dunfee and Friedman recognized that the judiciary was
institutionally incapable of resolving the jurisdictional question raised by the
extraterritorial application of antitrust law. They created their proposal as a
mechanism by which the executive branch could provide consistent national
guidance to the courts as to when jurisdiction should not be exercised. Dunfee
and Friedman's proposal was made in a different era of international antitrust,
when tension between America and its trading partners was greater, antitrust
policies were much more divergent, and the extraterritorial application of
America's antitrust laws was particularly problematic with respect to specific
corporations or industries. Therefore, Dunfee and Friedman structured their
proposal to focus on individual cases before the U.S. courts, and they assumed
U.S. jurisdiction would be appropriate except in those "relatively rare"
instances when the executive deemed it inappropriate.
274
There are two interrelated problems with Dunfee and Friedman's
approach with respect to Empagran-type suits. First, it provides no guidance
as to when the executive should ask the courts to defer jurisdiction except
because of "foreign policy interests. 275 Such a broad mandate invites political
decision-making in an area that should be guided by whether U.S. jurisdiction
would be appropriate to achieve the goals of maximal deterrence, consistent
and predictable trade policies, and international harmonization of antitrust
regimes. The potential for political interference is enhanced by Dunfee and
Friedman's reliance on an analysis based on the specific facts of a case. One
can easily imagine the subtle and not-so-subtle pressures that multinational
corporations would apply to affect the executive's decision on whether to ask
the courts to waive jurisdiction. Dunfee and Friedman take this approach
because-reflecting the lack of antitrust harmonization at the time-they
assume U.S. jurisdiction is always appropriate except in relatively rare
circumstances. To correct these problems, I suggest modifyring Dunfee and
Friedman's proposal so that U.S. courts would exercise jurisdiction except
when the executive asked a court to decline jurisdiction based on the
principles of forum non conveniens articulated in Piper-a determination that
271. Id.
272. Id. at 924.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 923.
275. Id. at 924.
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the home countries of the plaintiffs or defendants provide an effective forum
for the recovery of at least compensatory damages.
Even this modified proposal is problematic. First, although the analysis
would now be applied country-by-country, the DOJ would still issue its
guidance on a case-by-case basis. Such an approach would be labor-intensive
for the DOJ, which would need to monitor all Empagran-type suits before the
courts and file briefs with each individual court. Foreign plaintiffs and
defendants from the same countries may be treated differently either because
of a DOJ decision not to issue a letter in a specific instance or because the
DOJ simply failed to issue a letter for other reasons. Second, there is no
guarantee the courts would follow the DOJ's recommendation in an individual
case. Thus, the uncertainty regarding U.S. jurisdiction in Empagran-type suits
might be reduced, but it would not be eliminated. Plaintiffs would still have
hope that their case would not receive a Dunfee and Friedman letter or that
they could craft a brief that would convince a court to exercise jurisdiction
despite the executive's recommendation. Finally, other countries would not
know what they needed to do to prevent their nationals from being hauled
before the U.S. courts. Countries that work to harmonize their antitrust
policies with those of the United States may be frustrated by a determination
by a district court that they have not gone far enough. Although DOJ guidance
to the courts, based on the principles of forum non conveniens, would improve
how the United States addresses jurisdiction in Empagran-type suits, it is still
not an optimal national solution.
5. A New Approach to the Empagran Problem: Legislative
Authorization to the Executive Branch To Limit Jurisdiction Based
on the Principles of Foreign Non Conveniens
A better approach would systematize the executive branch's review of
other countries' antitrust regimes, apply that executive determination
categorically over a class of cases, and remove judicial discretion with respect
to complying with that executive determination. Accordingly, I recommend
that the DOJ2 7 6 should annually review other countries' antitrust regimes to
determine whether they provide private parties an adequate forum to recover
damages from cartel activities. Congress should amend 277 section 12 of the
Clayton Act to bar jurisdiction in cases involving international cartels in
which (1) neither the plaintiff nor the defendant is a national of the United
States, and (2) the plaintiff or defendant is a national of a country that the DOJ
currently lists as one that provides plaintiffs with an adequate 278 private
remedy in the antitrust claim, except (3) when that country permits United
States jurisdiction for reasons of judicial economy. Such a law would promote
international judicial economy in a transparent and predictable manner that
276. To minimize political influence over these determinations, Congress could instead provide
the Federal Trade Commission with this authority.
277. Rather than pass a unilateral act of Congress, the United States could negotiate a bilateral
or multilateral agreement.
278. Such an amendment could also provide guidance on what private remedies are adequate,
such as the verified, actual ability to recover at least single damages for antitrust harms through a
judicial or administrative process.
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prevents forum shopping without greatly reducing the deterrent effect of
United States law.
The principles underlying this proposed law are those of the doctrine of
forum non conveniens as articulated in Piper. Thus, if plaintiffs can secure
relief in their domestic courts for antitrust violations that involve foreign
harms, they should not be able to sue a foreign defendant in U.S. courts
simply because the damages available there may be more favorable. However,
when a foreign plaintiff cannot secure relief in her domestic courts--either
because the courts do not permit jurisdiction over the claims or because the
statutory relief is not actually available-she should first turn to the court
system in which the foreign defendant is located. Again, this result would
accord with a concern for convenience and judicial economy. Only if the
plaintiff cannot receive adequate relief in her home forum or the defendant's
home forum should U.S. courts exercise jurisdiction, assuming the requisite
showing of a link to domestic effect is made. Such an exercise of jurisdiction
would not be an act of charity toward the plaintiff; it would recognize that
affording such plaintiffs an opportunity for relief somewhere is necessary to
deter the international cartels that harm American consumers and businesses.
Such a restriction of jurisdiction would not affect the ability of American
plaintiffs to bring antitrust claims against anyone in the world, nor would it
prevent U.S. courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases involving
American defendants. Instead, this restriction on jurisdiction would apply only
when neither the plaintiff nor the defendant was an American. In such
situations, the United States retains an interest in ensuring that plaintiffs can
receive adequate compensation because of its deterrent effect on international
cartels that affect the United States. However, if such claims could be better
heard before a foreign court, the United States should decline jurisdiction
because of convenience and judicial economy.279
The DOJ's annual review of other countries' private antitrust remedies
should be more than a broad "thumbs-up, thumbs-down" review; it should
distinguish the types of claims for which a country's relief is adequate from
those for which it is inadequate. For example, although Canada has a strong
anti-cartel regime, it also protects its domestic export cartels.280 Such
protectionist policies-of which the FTAIA is one-do not enhance
worldwide deterrence,28' and when implemented by foreign governments,
they specifically do not deter conduct harming American consumers.
Therefore, the DOJ would list Canada as a country that provides an adequate
forum except in cases involving Canadian export cartels. Similarly, other
countries may not permit foreign plaintiffs to sue their domestic firms for
participating in an international cartel, though domestic plaintiffs can bring
such actions. In these situations, the DOJ would list those countries as
providing an adequate forum for domestic plaintiffs, but U.S. jurisdiction
279. Such a policy could also advance the United States's foreign policy interests by avoiding
conflict with other developed countries with which it collaborates in antitrust enforcement.
280. Canada Amicus Brief, supra note 21, at 15 ("[A]greements entered into by competitors
who collectively lack market power in Canada are legal because the requisite 'undue' economic effect is
not present.").
281. See supra note 212.
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would be permitted if the plaintiffs were foreigners who also lacked an
adequate forum in their home country.
The definition of "adequate" relief is an important component of this
proposal. Consistent with the principles of forum non conveniens articulated
in Piper, the United States should not require that countries provide treble
damages. The United States should decline jurisdiction in anti-cartel actions
so long as plaintiffs can recover at least compensatory damages. America's
mandatory treble damages regime is based on a policy choice in the United
States regarding the proper mix of public and private enforcement. The fact
that other governments do not provide treble damages may reflect other
aspects of their systems, such as greater public fines, the availability of
punitive damages, or the cost to plaintiffs of bringing actions for damages.
The United States should not require treble damages as the sole mechanism of
deterrence.
Refusing jurisdiction in international antitrust suits may sacrifice some
global judicial economy. The nature of international cartel activities increases
the possibility that the same defendants will simultaneously face multiple
lawsuits in many countries. By splitting the plaintiffs' actions, these multiple
lawsuits could complicate the suits, delay them, and make them more
282
expensive. For this reason, the U.S. courts could exercise jurisdiction if the
nations implicated in the case ask it to do so. Admittedly, this is only a partial
solution to the issue of global judicial economy. A more comprehensive
solution will require additional political solutions, such as an international
agreement permitting some form of transnational transfer or consolidation of
cases. Such agreement is foreseeable, as informal collaboration already occurs
with respect to public lawsuits against international cartel members.
This proposal would help achieve America's three goals with respect to
international antitrust. First, the U.S. government would have a national policy
with respect to jurisdiction in international cartel cases that distinguishes
between those foreign antitrust regimes that are effective and those that are
not. Second, such a policy would be consistent and predictable, facilitating
international trade. Plaintiffs and defendants would know whether jurisdiction
could be exercised before bringing a case. Plaintiffs from countries that the
United States deems to have an effective antitrust regime would have no
reason to bring a case in U.S. courts, and they would therefore need to turn to
their home jurisdiction. In this manner, the policy would encourage other
jurisdictions to enact policies that would be in harmony with those of the
United States. For example, with respect to Canada, the exercise of U.S.
jurisdiction with respect to a Canadian export cartel may cause Canadian
lawmakers to tear down their measures protecting such cartels, especially if
they wish to protect Canadian defendants from America's treble damages
282. An example in intellectual property is Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt
Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481, 491-92 (2d Cir. 1998) (vacating a forum non conveniens dismissal of foreign
copyright infringement claim because private interests of plaintiffs in not having claims split among
multiple jurisdictions outweighed other Gilbert factors).
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regime.283 Upon such action, the DOJ would determine that U.S. jurisdiction
should no longer be granted in such cases. Thus, this proposal, like my
suggested reforms of national amnesty programs, seeks to harmonize
international antitrust policies and to do so in a manner that most effectively
deters international cartels.
6. Response to Possible Objections to this Proposal
My proposal is consistent with precedents regarding the ability of the
executive to limit the jurisdiction of federal courts in favor of alternative
international fora. For example, in 1981, the United States negotiated the
release of the American hostages from Iran. As part of that agreement, the
President issued an Executive Order that suspended all private claims against
Iran pending before the U.S. courts in favor of international arbitration before
the United States-Iran International Claims Tribunal. If the Tribunal
determined that it had jurisdiction over the American plaintiffs claims, the
U.S. courts could no longer hear their claims. In Dames & Moore v. Regan,
28 4
the Supreme Court allowed the President to limit the courts' jurisdiction in
this manner without specific congressional authorization.285 "Crucial" to the
Court's decision was "the conclusion that Congress has implicitly approved
the practice of claim settlement by executive agreement"' '286 Responding to
the plaintiff's claims that the President was divesting the federal courts of
jurisdiction, the Court noted that claims were only suspended to the degree the
International Claims Tribunal had jurisdiction over the matter, and that, if the
tribunal lacked jurisdiction, the plaintiffs were free to return to U.S. courts.
Therefore, the Court viewed the President's settlement power as simply
"effect[ing] a change in the substantive law governing the lawsuit., 287 "This
case, in short, illustrates the difference between modifying federal-court
jurisdiction and directing the courts to apply a different rule of law., 288
Although Dames & Moore could be read to only apply to the specific
instance of resolving private claims against other nations, the President has
exercised his foreign affairs powers to negotiate trade agreements that
similarly limit the jurisdiction of Article III courts over other private disputes.
For example, both the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (FTA)
and the North American Free Trade Agreement contain provisions that
"replace[] Article III judicial review of administrative antidumping and
countervailing duty . . . decisions with review by a binational arbitral
283. Indeed, America's treble damages regime would provide an incentive for foreign
companies to lobby their countries to enact antitrust policies sufficiently strong to remove them from
U.S. jurisdiction in Empagran-type suits.
284. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
285. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 676 ("We are reluctant to conclude that this provision
constitutes specific authorization to the President to suspend claims in American courts."); see also Evan
Todd Bloom, Note, The Executive Claims Settlement Power: Constitutional Authority and Foreign
Affairs Applications, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 155 (1985).
286. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 680.
287. Id. at 685.
288. Id
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panel." '289 Despite numerous court challenges in the seventeen years since the
Canada-U.S. FTA was enacted, these provisions still remain in effect.
Congress has also enacted legislation that grants the President the
authority to determine the subject matter jurisdictional limits of the federal
courts with respect to international topics. For example, Congress has carved
out exceptions to the general foreign sovereign immunity that states enjoy
from U.S. lawsuits. One exception is for terrorism. U.S. courts have
jurisdiction over a foreign state for a claim arising out of an act of terrorism if
"the foreign state was ... designated as a state sponsor of terrorism ... at the
time the act occurred, unless later so designated as a result of such act .... 290
Molora Vadnais notes that, "the terrorism exception applies only to states that
are designated by the State Department as state sponsors of terrorism.,
291
My proposal accords with these judicial and legislative precedents. My
proposal represents explicit congressional authorization for the President to
determine the scope of international antitrust jurisdiction with respect to more
convenient, alternative fora. As in Dames & Moore, if such fora do not exist,
the U.S. courts retain jurisdiction over the claims. Thus, my proposal only
limits the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts as an explicit grant of
authority from Congress to the President so the President can best further
America's economic and trade interests.
My proposal is also consistent with the desire by many economists and
legal scholars to see some form of global antitrust authority established.
Eleanor Fox notes, "international antitrust has been a gleam in the eye of the
world at least since the proposal of the Havana Charter in the 1940s.,,29' Yet
while there are "seeds"2  for some sort of international antitrust charter, there
is disagreement as to whether the international community should adopt a
common international antitrust code,294 establish an oversight body along the
lines of the World Trade Organization to ensure compliance with such a code,
or create a world antitrust court to adjudicate important private international
disputes.295 Indeed, the United States and the European Union-arguably the
two jurisdictions that present the most agreement on the substantive aspects of
international antitrust-occupy diametrically opposed positions with respect
to the form international antitrust enforcement should take. The European
Union favors binding dispute resolution in the WTO; the United States favors
a more voluntary approach that focuses on technical assistance and the
issuance of voluntary standards. Although there has been convergence in
289. See Matthew Burton, Note, Assigning the Judicial Power to International Tribunals:
NAFTA Binational Panels and Foreign Affairs Flexibility, 88 VA. L. REv. 1529, 1530 (2002); see also
Patricia Kelmar, Note, Binational Panels of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement in Action:
The Constitutional Challenge Continues, 27 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 173 (1993).
290. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(A)(7)(a) (2000).
291. Molora Vadnais, Comment, The Terrorism Exception to the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act: Forward Leaning Legislation or Just Bad Law?, 5 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 199,
203 (2000).
292. Eleanor Fox, International Antitrust and the Doha Dome, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 911, 912
(2003).
293. Id.
294. Diane P. Wood, Antitrust at the Global Level, 72 U. CH. L. REv. 309 (2005).
295. Fox provides a nice summary of the various proposals in international antitrust. Fox, supra
note 292, at 925-32.
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substantive antitrust policies, there, too, disagreement exists. The substantive
disagreements led Judge Diane Wood, after proposing a baseline general
international antitrust code, to note that in actually negotiating such a code,
"the details would indeed be devilish" and to "wonder whether the effort it
would take to achieve international consensus on all [of the areas of antitrust]
would be worth it." 296 As an international antitrust regime is still such a
distant possibility, I prefer to propose an improvement to the status quo rather
than waiting for the intellectually best solution.
Absent an international agreement establishing some form of global
antitrust regime, the international community needs to work to further
harmonize their practices to fill the enforcement gaps that allow corporate
criminals like cartels to thrive.297 I believe my proposal is the best
mechanism-absent an international agreement-to encourage harmonization
of antitrust policies with respect to international cartels. By exercising
jurisdiction over claims by plaintiffs located in countries where the laws do
not provide adequate relief, the United States implicitly encourages those
countries to implement and enforce laws that provide such relief. Although
other nations might respond negatively to America's judgment of their
antitrust regimes, their objections should be mollified by the fact that such
judgments are undertaken to limit, rather than extend, American power
298through an exercise of jurisdictional restraint.
Still, international antitrust disagreements will persist, but such
disagreements are not created by the United States. Instead, they reflect real
policy differences between the United States and its trading allies regarding
the degree to which all cartels, especially domestic export cartels, should be
deterred, the viability of private antitrust suits as a means of policing cartel
activities, and the ability of the United States to protect its consumers, even at
the expense of foreign corporations. Empagran has not generated conflict; it
has only revealed it. Accordingly, I reject the view that the absence of
conflict, such as would result by closing our courts to Empagran-type suits, is
equivalent to harmony. Instead, the closing of our courts to all Empagran-type
suits would represent a surrender of America's interest in protecting its
consumers from the harms of international cartels. At the least, such a
capitulation of America's vital economic interests should not be achieved by
judicial fiat.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this Note, I have proposed a resolution to the concerns expressed by
the various governments in their amici briefs to the Supreme Court in
Hoffman LaRoche v. Empagran. My proposal is grounded in the deterrence
rationale of the U.S. antitrust laws. International cartels are a criminal scourge
in our globalized economy, creating billions of dollars of deadweight loss in
296. Wood, supra note 294, at 324.
297. For further discussion, see Diane P. Wood, International Harmonization ofAntitrust Law:
The Tortoise or the Hare?, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 391 (2002).
298. Indeed, I would argue that my proposal is no more problematic than the clawback statutes
and frustration-of-judgment statutes, which connote a negative view of America's antitrust policies.
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developed and developing economies alike. Effective deterrence of
international cartels cannot stop at America's borders. If America is
adequately to protect its citizens from the harms of international cartels, it
must lead proactively and internationally by cooperating with other
governments where they have developed their own effective anti-cartel
regimes and by filling the void left where governments are unable or
unwilling to institute effective anti-cartel regimes. Accordingly, my proposal
seeks to engage all three branches of the United States government in this
effort by calling on Congress to pass legislation that empowers the executive
to guide the courts as to when and under what circumstances U.S. jurisdiction
should be granted to foreign plaintiffs suing international cartel members for
harms sustained abroad. At the same time, I have tried to show that exercising
jurisdiction will not undermine the United States's successful domestic
amnesty programs, and with proper adjustments in the United States and
abroad, U.S. jurisdiction over Empagran-type claims could improve amnesty
programs worldwide. These proposals are consistent with-and help
promote-a convergence in antitrust regimes worldwide. If jurisdiction is
legal power, it is power that America can apply wisely.
This Note may offer another lesson, this one in the area of international
law. The international concerns embodied in the FTAIA line of litigation fall
within a larger range of controversies around concurrent jurisdiction. Rather
than trying to apply a single, universal judicial standard-such as nationality,
territoriality, comity, or effects-to resolve Empagran's jurisdictional issues, I
have proposed a legislative-executive-judicial solution that is partially an
effects standard, partially a nationality standard, and partially a comity
standard. It is an approach that is anchored in policy goals (deterrence) and
international norms (opposition to international cartels). I do not suggest my
specific solution should be copied in other international law contexts, or even
in other international antitrust contexts. I merely suggest that resolutions to the
concurrent jurisdiction controversies that seem endemic to our globalized
world might proceed best from a solid understanding of the policy goals and
international norms specific to each situation.
